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Abstract 
This paper investigates the extent and nature of distortions in the labor market in the Republic of 
Côte d’Ivoire (RCI) by using quantile regression analysis on employer-employee data from the 
manufacturing sector.  We found that the labor markets in Côte d’Ivoire do not seem to be much 
distorted.  Unions may influence employment through tenure but do not seem to influence wages 
directly except for vulnerable minorities that seem protected by unions.  Establishment-size wage 
effects are pronounced and highest for white-collar workers.  This may be explained by the 
efficiency wage theory, so that, even in the absence of unions, segmentation and inefficiencies 
will still be present as long as firms seek to retain their employees by paying wages above the 
market clearing level.  The inefficiency arising from establishment-size wage effects can be 
mitigated by education.  Furthermore, the premium to education is found highly significantly 
positive only for higher education, and not for basic education, indicating that educational 
policies should also focus on higher education. 
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1. Introduction 
The lack of labor demand is the main problem in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), while labor 
supply is not a big problem.  This consideration along with recent adverse terms of trade 
movements for SSA key export products call for flexibility of labor markets.   
The labor market in Côte d’Ivoire has been deregulated but few studies analyze the 
possible existence of labor market distortions both before and after the start of reforms.
1  Rama 
(1998) analyzes wage misalignment in RCI.  He concludes that minimum wages are no source of 
distortion in the Ivorian labor market; real minimum wages in 1996 accounted for only about 35 
percent of their level 20 years earlier.
2 
In this study we focus on two possible sources of labor market distortions in Côte 
d’Ivoire in the mid-late 1990s.  First, we investigate the possible effects of unions on the 
individual income generation in the private manufacturing sector.  Even though this sector 
involves only a small part of the labor force, it still plays an important role since a large part of 
exports originates from this sector, and since any export commodity dispersion is likely to come 
from this sector.
3  Second, we analyze the possible existence of efficiency wages arising from 
employer-size wage effects. 
Furthermore, the paper aims at analyzing the characteristics of the small group of private 
manufacturing sector workers—who to some extent may be viewed as role models—and how 
they differ within and between occupational groups.  This may have implications for educational 
policies, for example, and is an important complement to the household-based analysis by 
Verner (1999c), which found that union effects cannot be analyzed in the 1990s due to survey 
changes. 
One reason for the lack of studies that look at union effects in RCI is that the topic can 
only be satisfactorily analyzed by firm level data.  This paper presents one of the first studies of 
employer-employee data, the so-called Regional Program on Enterprise Development (RPED) 
data set on Côte d’Ivoire from 1995 and 1996.  This type of data represents a clear advantage to 
prior studies of the labor market, which rely on household surveys that are rather sparse on 
                                                 
1 Appendix E contains an overview of labor market studies in RCI that makes use of regression techniques, based on 
individual data, to analyze wage/income generation. 
2 This drop is in line with market average wages which fell 60 percent in the 1985-95 period (Verner, 1999). 
3 Rama (1998) quotes ILO numbers, estimating 300,000 individuals as being union members in 1995 out of a total 
labor force of 7,063,000, which is equivalent to 4.25 percent of the entire labor force.  These numbers are only 
estimates and highly uncertain. 3 
information about firms.  Likewise, the data at hand proves superior to macro or aggregate data 
since the latter do not allow for direct linking of employers and employees. 
The analysis is carried out using quantile regression techniques, which allow a more in-
depth characterization of individuals across the entire wage distribution, than does the more 
standard technique of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). 
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 gives a brief overview of the Ivorian 
economy in the late 1990s.  Section 3 outlines the economic model and explains the basic 
principles behind quantile regressions.  Section 4 describes the surveys and the variables.   
Section 5 discusses a number of descriptive statistics and section 6 presents analytical results 
from quantile regressions.  Finally, section 7 concludes with a summary of findings and policy 
implications and recommendations. 
 
2. The Ivorian economy in the late 20
th century 
As many Sub-Sahara African countries, RCI experienced a very severe recession 
throughout the 1980s, triggered by a dramatic fall in export prices for key commodities such as 
cocoa, coffee, and oil.  At the same time, the CFA was pegged to the French franc, and the latter 
appreciated substantially against the US dollar, resulting in a deterioration of competitiveness 
and a drop in exports from RCI.  Furthermore, the 1980s were characterized by a labor market 
heavily restricted by rules and regulations.  For instance, as reported by Rama (1998), the 
government had monopoly over hiring decisions.  All vacancies had to be reported to central 
offices, which also were responsible for registering all job searchers and making all placements, 
despite a tendency for these offices to be highly inefficient.  Firing costs were high, too, since 
workers fired for economic reasons often managed to obtain several yearly salaries due to the 
courts’ assessment that firing was “abusive”. 
The 50 percent devaluation of the CFA in 1994 removed a major obstacle to economic 
adjustment in Côte d’Ivoire, and resulted in a major repatriation of flight capital from the early 
1990s when the currency was overvalued.  Afterwards, the economy has blossomed.  Annual 
GDP growth has averaged more than 6 percent; investments almost doubled from 1993 to 1996; 
and the wage bill to GDP ratio declined by one third in the same period.  The labor market was 4 
also included in the general drive towards more democracy.  Competition in collective 
bargaining was introduced and the monopoly of hiring and firing decisions was abandoned.
4 
Sub-Sahara Africa, including RCI, experienced a dramatic fall in the prices of its key 
commodities.  The prices in the late 1990s were the lowest in 30 years, and the outlook for long-
term real prices is not favorable.  Exports from RCI constitute 28 percent of GDP, which is 
relatively high for a Sub-Saharan country but far below the level obtained in RCI in the late 
1970s.  Furthermore, exports from RCI is highly concentrated with 46 percent of total exports to 
OECD in 1997 being in one single commodity, cocoa, which makes the economy highly 
vulnerable to price fluctuations.
5   
 
3. Methodology 
3.1. The economic model 
One could argue that wages and employment are determined jointly and hence constitute 
a system of equations to be estimated (Verner 1999a, b).  But, Maloney and Ribeiro (1999) note 
that standard wage equations with employment omitted can be thought of as a reduced form and 
can be estimated using one-step estimators such as least squares or quantile regressions.  Hence, 
the underlying economic model used in the analysis will simply follow Mincer’s (1974) human 
capital earnings function extended to control for a number of other variables that relate to the 
firm.  In particular, we apply a semi-logarithmic framework that has the form: 
 ln  yi = φ(xi, zi) + ui         ( 1 )  
where ln yi is the log of earnings or wages for individual i; xi is a measure of a number of 
personal characteristics, including human capital variables, ethnicity, etc.; and zi represents firm-
specific variables, for instance, profit per employee in the firm.  The functional form is left 
unspecified in equation (1).  We choose to make extensive use of dummy variables in order to 
catch non-linearities in returns to years of schooling, tenure, and other quantitative variables.  
The last component, ui, is a random disturbance term that reflects unobserved characteristics. 
 
3.2. Quantile regressions 
                                                 
4 Verner (1999c) gives a more detailed historical description of the RCI economy. 
5 Source:  UN Comtrade, World Bank (1998a, b). 5 
The method applied in this paper is quantile regression.  The idea is that one can choose 
any quantile and thus obtain many different parameter estimates.  In this manner the entire 
conditional distribution can be explored.  By testing whether coefficients for a given variable 
across different quantiles are significantly different, one implicitly also tests for conditional 
heteroskedasticity across the wage distribution.  
The method has many other virtues apart from being robust to heteroskedasticity.  When 
the error term is non-normal, for instance, quantile regression estimators may be more efficient 
than least squares estimators.
6  Furthermore, since the quantile regression objective function is a 
weighted sum of absolute deviations, one obtains a robust measure of location and, as a 
consequence, the estimated coefficient vector is not sensitive to outlier observations on the 
dependent variable.
7 
The main advantage, though, is the semi-parametric nature of the approach, which 
relaxes the restrictions on the parameters to be fixed across the entire distribution.  Intuitively, 
quantile regression estimates convey information on wage differentials arising from non-
observable characteristics among individuals otherwise observationally equivalent.  In other 
words, by using quantile regressions, we can determine if individuals that rank in different 
positions in the conditional distribution (i.e., individuals that have higher or lower wages than 
predicted by observable characteristics) receive different premiums to education, tenure, or to 
other relevant observable variables. 
Labor market studies usually make use of conditional mean regression estimators, such as 
Ordinary Least Squares
8.  This technique is subject to criticism because of several, usually heroic 
assumptions underlying the approach.  One is the assumption of heteroskedasticity in the 
distribution of the error terms.  If the sample is not completely homogenous, this approach, by 
                                                 
6 Ibid. 
7 That is, if  0 ˆ > ′ − θ β i i x y , then yi can be increased toward + ∞, or if  0 ˆ < ′ − θ β i i x y , yi can be decreased toward -∞, 
without altering the solution  θ β ˆ
.  In other words, it is not the magnitude of the dependent variable that matters but 
on which side of the estimated hyperplane the observation is.  This is most easily seen by considering the FOC to 
(3), which can be shown to be given as (see Buchinsky 1998)  ∑
=
= ′ − + −
n
i
i i i n x x y
1
2
1
2
1 1 . 0 )) ˆ sgn( ( θ β θ  
This can be seen both as a strength and a weakness of the method.  In the present context, with data from Côte 
d’Ivoire, the advantages seem to outweigh the disadvantages, since the reliability of data from LDCs generally is 
questionable.  However, to the extent that a given outlier represents a feature of the "true” distribution of the 
population, one would prefer the estimator to be sensitive to such an outlier—at least to a certain degree. 
8 See Velenchik (1997) and Verner (1999a,b). 6 
forcing the parameters to be the same across the entire distribution of individuals may be too 
restrictive and may hide important information. 
A simple solution and yet a powerful tool is to make use of quantile regression 
techniques.  The method of quantile regression amounts to minimizing the absolute sum of errors 
rather than, as in least squares, minimizing the sum of their squares. 
Formally the method, first developed by Koenker and Basset (1978), can be formulated 
as
9 
 y i = xi′βθ + uθi = Quantθ(yi | xi) = xi′βθ       ( 2 )  
where Quantθ(yi | xi) denotes the θ
th conditional quantile of y given x, and i denotes an index over 
all individuals, i = 1,…,n. 
In general, the θ
th  sample quantile (0 < θ < 1) of y solves  
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Buchinsky (1995) examines various estimators for the asymptotic covariance matrix and 
concludes that the design matrix bootstrap performs the best.  In this paper, the standard errors 
are obtained by bootstrapping using 200 repetitions, in line with the literature. 
 
4. Data description 
4.1. The Surveys 
The data used in this study are drawn from surveys of manufacturing firms in Côte 
d’Ivoire conducted in 1995 and 1996.  The surveys are part of the RPED, a multi-year study of 
the manufacturing sector in several African countries (Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, 
Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe).  The RPED was organized by the Africa 
Region Technical Department of the World Bank. 
The RPED is designed to provide an overview of the performance of manufacturing firms 
in the post-structural adjustment period, and focuses on a wide variety of aspects of firm 
behavior.  The survey instruments include several modules covering creation of the enterprise; 
the enterprise in general; interior competition; labor markets; financial markets; solutions to 
                                                 
9 See Buchinsky (1998). 7 
conflicts; infrastructure; regulations; adjustments; investors; use of help from (public) 
institutions; employees; and apprentices. 
In Côte d’Ivoire, data were collected for two successive years, covering 234 and 230 
manufacturing enterprises in 1995 and 1996, respectively.  A moving panel structure was 
applied, which implies that some of the firms surveyed in 1995 also were surveyed in 1996.  
Likewise, some workers surveyed in 1995 were also included in the sample in 1996.  Problems 
of sample attrition and missing values for some key variables haunt the surveys and have 
seriously reduced the sample size, both in terms of number of observations and variables, 
requiring that we pool the two samples.  By doing so, we implicitly assume that the relatively 
few firms (26) and workers (95) that are counted twice are no source of bias; that is, firms and 
workers present in both years do not, in any systematic fashion, deviate from firms and workers 
not present in both years.
10  The wages of the pooled sample are deflated, using 1995 as the base 
year.  The samples do not contain information on regional locality, presumably because the vast 
majority of firms are located in Abidjan.  Hence, no regional or spatial deflation is feasible.  To 
the extent that some firms are from outside Abidjan, results may lead to a downward bias in the 
salaries of workers employed in these firms. 
Furthermore, women represent only 10 percent of the observations.  This may mirror the 
true picture; but the sample is deemed too small for meaningful analysis of women, and these 
observations are, therefore, excluded from the analysis.  Hence, both sample and any policy 
recommendations are limited to male workers employed in the manufacturing sector.  The 
number of observations is 891 males that work in 128 different manufacturing enterprises.
11 
Despite the abovementioned problems, the data set remains highly interesting, since it is 
among the first data collected on manufacturing enterprises in Côte d’Ivoire.  For the selected 
group consisting of male workers employed in the manufacturing sector, we are able to perform 
meaningful analysis despite the limitations discussed above. 
                                                 
10 In the regression analysis, we include a dummy that equals 1 if the year is 1996 and zero otherwise.  This dummy 
almost always turns out to be significant.  Our interpretation is that, while the samples may differ, none can, a priori, 
be said to be more representative of the “true” population.  Pooling the samples can perhaps average out any non-
representativeness, resulting in a pooled sample that may even be more representative. 
11 Ideally, one would take into account the potential (self)-selection taking place here, and estimate, e.g., a selection 
model in the vein of Heckman (1979) and others.  However, it is increasingly recognized that this method requires 
assumptions that are not likely to hold.  For instance, assumptions on what is determining the selection mechanism 
has to be made, and the results in the wage-equation are often very sensitive to these assumptions.  Therefore, we 
choose not to apply any selection method.  Given that we only study males, the issue of self-selection may be less of 
a problem as compared to biases, had the analysis included females, where selection tends to be most prevalent. 8 
4.2. Variables 
Dependent variable:  
We use wages as our dependent variable.  Throughout the paper, these are calculated and 
reported as real monthly wages.  In the quantile regressions, the dependent variable is the natural 
log of monthly wages.
12  
Explanatory variables: 
Age dummies:  yrgroup1 includes all workers aged 15-25; yrgroup2 includes workers 
aged 26-45 years; and yrgroup3 includes workers aged 46-65.  These variables proxy for general 
experience (firm-specific experience is captured by tenure (see below)). 
Educational dummies:  edunone includes all workers with no education; edubasic 
includes workers who have obtained primary or secondary education diplomas; and eduhigh 
includes workers who have obtained a higher degree than secondary diploma. 
Union variables:  Two union variables are included in the analysis.  The first variable 
union takes on the value of 1 if the worker himself indicates he is a union member, and zero 
otherwise.  The second variable density is a proxy for the degree of unionization in each 
establishment.  It is constructed as the ratio of interviewed workers in a given firm that state they 
are members of a union relative to all interviewed workers in the firm.  
Tenure dummies:  tenure1 is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if tenure in 
the current job is 0-5 years and zero otherwise; tenure2 equals 1 if tenure in current job is 6-12 
years and zero otherwise; and tenure3 equals 1 if tenure is longer than 12 years and zero 
otherwise. 
Occupational dummies:  The workers are split into 5 different categories:  manager 
includes management, supervisors, and foremen; admsales includes administration and sales 
personnel; techmain includes technicians and maintenance; qprod includes qualified production 
workers; and support is a dummy variable for support staff. 
Industrial dummies:  The workers are split into 5 broad industrial categories, which are 
textile, food, wood, metal, and a group with “other industry” or “industry not stated” called 
otherin. 
                                                 
12 Any measure of in-kind benefits is not part of this variable and is not included in the analysis.  Admittedly, these 
may be important but there are too many missing values for them to be included. 9 
Firm size:  The number of employees in each firm was split into 4 groups:  microf 
includes firms with less than 17 employees; smallf includes firms with 17-40 employees; 
mediumf includes firms with 41-99 employees; and largef includes firms with 100 or more 
employees.  Furthermore, we constructed a variable, firm40, which takes on the value of 1 if the 
number of employees in the firm is 40 or more, and zero otherwise. 
Other variables:  We include a dummy variable for nationality/ethnicity, Ivorian, that 
equals 1 if the worker's nationality is Ivorian and zero otherwise; a dummy variable for the 
nationality of the owner, franlib, that takes on the value of 1 if there is a majority of French or 
Lebanese owners and zero otherwise.  Finally, we include a variable, profitper, to measure profit 
per employee in each firm. 
 
5. Descriptive statistics 
A little more than half of the workers included in the sample are trade union members 
(table A1 in appendix A).  Not surprisingly, larger firms tend to be more unionized than smaller 
firms.  About 72 percent of the men working in a firm with 40 employees or more report union 
membership, while the corresponding number for firms with less than 40 employees is 31 
percent.  Since 57 percent of the firms with 40 or more employees are owned by a majority of 
either French or Lebanese stockholders, naturally the same picture emerges when one looks at 
unionization across ownership.  Sixty-seven percent of the workers in French/Lebanese owned 
firms are in a union as compared to 43 percent of the workers in firms not owned by a majority 
of French/Lebanese stockholders.  However, the causality between rate of unionization, size of 
firm, and nationality of ownership is not clear. 
Workers with no education (edunone) are less prone to be organized than workers with 
basic education, and even less prone than workers with high education (42 percent, 63 percent, 
and 52 percent, respectively).  Occupational groups such as managers, administrative and sales 
personnel, technicians, and maintenance staff are relatively more often members of a union than 
are qualified production workers and, especially, than are support personnel.  
Almost half of the workers report tenure of less than 6 years in the firm where they are 
currently working, while the rest are equally distributed in the ‘6-12’ and ‘more than 12’ years of 
tenure brackets.  Tenure is generally much longer in French/Lebanese owned firms.  These firms 10 
also tend to have more educated workers, so again there is an issue of causality.
13  
French/Lebanese-owned enterprises are not so active in the food, wood, or textile industries, but 
are mainly operating in the metal industry (47 percent). 
Very few of the workers (6 percent) report they have received training after entering the 
firm (in the form of either on-the-job training or training outside the enterprise).  With so few 
observations, it is very hard to generalize these findings.  However, it seems as if firms with 
more than 40 employees are undertaking more training (9 percent) than smaller firms (2 
percent)—corresponding to more training in firms with the higher educated workforce.   
Presumably, the higher the education the more “trainable” is the individual and, hence, the return 
to training increases with the level of education.  The data do support this hypothesis (table A4), 
but the number of observations is very low. 
The monthly real wages for the three different tenure groups are surprisingly closely 
distributed (see figure A1), whereas the three educational groups are widely dispersed.  Highly 
educated workers earn much higher wages than workers with no education or only basic 
education.  The earnings of highly educated workers are also very heterogeneous within the 
group, but they vary much more across the percentiles than do the wages for the other two 
educational groups.  The graph also indicates that wages of workers that are union members may 
be a little more homogeneous than wages of non-union members, since their wage curve is 
slightly more flat across the percentiles.  This corresponds to the calculations of decile ratios 
given in table A5.  This indicates that in the upper part of the distribution (50
th to 90
th), union and 
non-union member wage distributions differs the most.  In the low end (10
th to 50
th), the ratio 
50
th/10
th is almost the same for the 2 groups (union = 1.96; nonunion = 2.14), while the 90
th/50
th 
ratio differs more (union = 2.45; nonunion = 4.60). 
Finally, the firm size seems to influence the level of the wage distribution.  Large firms 
pay higher wages (figure A1), but there is less inequality within each group of firm size.  The 
inequality is almost identical within the two groups of firms (table A5). 
 
 
                                                 
13 Is the tenure longer because French/Lebanese firms treat their employees differently/better or because they hire 
more educated staff and tenure is positively related to the level of education?  The data do not support the last 
hypothesis:  eduhigh generally has a lower tenure related to it than does edubasic/edunone (see table A4).  One 
should not put too much emphasis on these very partial descriptions, though. 11 
6. Analytical results 
6.1. General results   
Table B1 presents the quantile regression results and, as a reference, OLS results. 
Estimates for the 10
th, 25
th, 50
th, 75
th, and 90
th quantiles are presented to identify differences 
between low earners and high earners conditional on observables.  Most of the variables enter 
with the expected sign at all quantiles.  In the following, each variable’s impact on wages is 
discussed.  
Age and tenure.  Both age dummies yrgroup2 and yrgroup3 are positive and highly 
statistically significant at all quantiles (10
th, 25
th, 50
th, 75
th, and 90
th), hence, impacting wages in 
RCI positively.  The age dummies proxy for general, as opposed to firm-specific experience.  
The regressions show that workers with general experience receive a premium, and the premium 
increases with increased skill level.  Tenure is also positive and the estimated coefficients are 
non-constant as they increase with tenure.  Tenure over 12 years (tenure3) is significant for all 
quantiles, while 6-12 years of tenure (tenure2) is highly insignificant in the upper quantiles (75
th 
and 90
th).  At the 90
th quantile, the coefficient even becomes negative, though it is statistically 
insignificant.  One would expect tenure to have a positive effect on wages as it captures a pay-off 
to experience.  In Côte d’Ivoire this pay-off does not seem to be systematic and, therefore, 
possibly delinks experience from wages.
14  
Education.  Completed basic education with diploma generally enters with the expected 
positive sign but is statistically insignificant at all quantiles (with respect to no completed 
education). This may be explained by the fact that we only analyze wages in the manufacturing 
sector (see more below).  Completed higher education relative to no completed education is 
positive and significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level across all quantiles.  The 
premium obtained by highly educated workers ranges between 33 percent (10
th) and 105 percent 
(90
th), and increases almost linearly with the quantile, vis-à-vis workers with no education.
15 
Why is there not a premium to basic education as compared to no completed education—
a result that strongly differs from prior expectations and from previous results in the literature 
(see survey-table in appendix E)?  In Verner (1999c) the return to basic education is generally 
found significant and positive.  When restricting the 1995 sample to males only (as we have 
                                                 
14 The result is robust to different splines.  In particular, introducing a dummy for 0-1 years of tenure and a dummy 
for 2-5 years of tenure along with tenure2 and tenure3 does not change the result. 12 
here), Verner also gets an insignificant return to basic education at the 10
th and 25
th quantiles.  
This could be a sign of a ‘structural’ shift in the wage setting since the return to basic education 
in the 1980s is found to be statistically significant.  One explanation could also be that our 
sample is highly selective: we do not look at the population as a whole but only at those 
privileged males employed in the manufacturing sector.  This selection may be more pronounced 
for individuals with no education since, relatively, these individuals are less prone to be in the 
manufacturing sector.  An analysis of the entire population could result in a significant impact on 
wages from having completed basic education.
16 
It is worth noticing that basic education impacts wages significantly in the OLS 
regression and, hence, analysis based on this method would have given an entirely different 
conclusion. 
Our interpretation of the finding is that education is important for the individual wage 
formation, but that basic level education (primary and secondary diplomas) is not enough to 
affect the wage setting process.  It may serve as a screening device in the hiring process.  For 
education to have a significant impact on wages in the manufacturing sector, a higher level of 
education is required. 
Employer size effects.  There is a very significant positive premium to being employed in 
large firms—the group of comparison is firms with less than 17 employees (microf).  The 
relationship is not linear since firms with 17-40 employees (smallf) get a higher premium than 
firms with 41-99 employees (mediumf).  This employer-size wage effect may arise from simple 
market based factors and merely be a sign of an efficient market.  It could, however, also be a 
sign of inefficiency—through efficiency wages, if it is not warranted by inferior working 
conditions or other factors.  This issue will be taken up in section 5.3. 
Industrial sectors.  The industry dummies are generally insignificant except for the metal 
industry, where employees receive a wage premium ranging between 15.2 percent (25
th) to 35.1 
percent (10
th) vis-à-vis the textile industry.  The metal industry is primarily run by 
French/Lebanese owners but this is already controlled for in the regression—the dummy variable 
for French/Lebanese ownership (franlib) is also positive and highly significant.  
                                                                                                                                                             
15 To obtain these premiums, one has to calculate (exp (coefficient estimate) - 1) * 100. 
16 Theoretically, another possibility is that school quality could have fallen.  We have no information on this issue. 13 
Union.  When all the abovementioned factors are taken into account, the union 
membership variable becomes statistically insignificant at all quantiles.  Hence, unions do not 
appear to have any measurable impact on workers’ wages.  One exception is the 75
th quantile, 
where union membership impact wages significantly negatively.  The “return” to union 
membership at the 75
th quantile is –13 percent.
17  This finding would be highly surprising for an 
analysis of labor markets in any OECD country.  For an LDC, it is less surprising due to the high 
level of underemployment, and our finding is also in line with the findings of several other 
studies.
18  An interpretation of the finding is that workers who earn a relatively high wage (that 
is, are at the 75
th quantile), given measured characteristics, are “punished” by the unions.   
Assume a worker with non-observable characteristics, such as motivation and reliability that are 
very “good”.  He ought to be paid a higher wage than other workers with the same observable 
characteristics; but union membership will push him down the wage ladder towards the average.  
It could also be an indication of a social awareness among the union member workers in the 75
th 
quantile, since they accept the unions' negative impact on their wage outcome—maybe in order 
to help secure the firms' competitiveness and their own future employment in a world of rapid 
technological change.  This interpretation points to a very different, more positive effect 
stemming from unions than they are normally attributed in the literature, which mainly focuses 
on OECD countries. 
In the theoretical literature on unions, it has long been recognized that unions may 
influence factors other than wages such as, for example, security in employment (tenure) or less 
variation in wages.  Still, a negative coefficient is unexpected.  Maloney and Rebeiro (1999) 
obtain similar results for the impact of union density on skilled-worker wages in Mexico.  They 
argue it could be due to more successful bargaining over firm rents by unskilled workers 
(received in forms other than wages), or that it is related to a desire to reduce the wedge between 
skilled and unskilled remuneration for equity reasons.  Such equity considerations may also 
apply here.  The issue of union influence and power will be further analyzed in the next section. 
Occupation.  The occupational variables turn out to be highly significant for all 
occupational groups and for all quantiles.  The reference group is support staff.  The wage 
premium to manager as compared to support staff increases over the quantiles from 100 percent 
                                                 
17 Substituting union membership with union density in the model specification, following the assumption that the 
union power depends on this, does not in any way alter the above results. 14 
(10
th) to 200 percent (90
th).  Not surprisingly, the premium decreases as one goes down in the 
“worker hierarchy.”  The technician/maintenance group receives premiums ranging from 43 
percent (10
th) to 110 percent (90
th); the administration/sales group receives a premium of some 
26 percent (10
th) up to 96 percent (90
th); and finally the qualified production workers receive 
premiums ranging from 7 percent (25
th) to 22 percent (90
th).  Generally, these numbers do only 
reveal substantial between-group heterogeneity; they also suggest extreme within-group 
heterogeneity across the distribution of male manufacturing workers.  The within (occupational) 
group heterogeneity is largest in the top of the “hierarchy” and decreases gradually.
19  
The same pattern of increasing premiums over the quantile-level is found for education:  
highly educated workers are much more heterogeneous than basic educated workers.  This is 
illustrated graphically for both education and occupation in figure B1, where 90 percent 
confidence limits also are given.  The figure suggests that not only are the coefficients changing 
across the distribution but the changes also seem to be statistically significant.  Indeed, simple 
one-sided t-tests confirm that coefficients change for occupational groups and higher education 
and that these changes generally are significant at the 1 percent level (table B2).  The standard 
regression techniques (OLS and 2SLS) hide many insights that are statistically important.  In the 
same vein, the t-tests show that for almost all variables there is too much heterogeneity to restrict 
the coefficient of a variable to be the same across the entire wage distribution. 
 
6.2. Separate analysis of union and non-union members 
In the following, we split the worker sample into two groups:  unionized and non-
unionized.  We split the sample to analyze if unions cause wage differentials or if they are more 
prone to be present in certain firms that also happen to pay higher (or lower, if the estimated 
coefficient to union is statistically significant and negative) wages. 
In the quantile regressions including all observations, tenure2 is insignificantly different 
from zero (table B1).  When the samples are split into unions being present at the workplace 
versus unions not being present, the tenure2-coefficient becomes significantly different from 
zero across quantiles in the union sample and remains insignificant in the non-union sample 
(table C1).  Therefore, constraining the tenure2 coefficient to be equal for both sub-groups could 
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give rise to differences in the union coefficient.  The differing tenure2 coefficient estimates may 
indicate, for example, union power that leads to wage promotions according to tenure.
20  The 
problem sketched here is one of selection bias in measuring the union premium, which perhaps 
can be mitigated by including the density variable in the union regressions.  Recall that density 
measures the share of workers interviewed at a given work plant that are union members, over all 
workers interviewed at the plant.  This variable is used as a proxy for unionization in the entire 
enterprise. 
A Mann-Whitney test for equality of sub-populations (workers in unionized firms are 
equal to workers in non-unionized firms) strongly rejects equality at the 1 percent level, which 
also suggests that union and non-union workers may be fundamentally different.
21  
On these grounds the sample was split into the two sub-samples:  one for workers from 
firms where part of the workforce are union members—that is, where density is different from 
zero; and one for workers from firms with no union members—that is, where density is equal to 
zero. 
A number of insights are obtained by splitting the samples by unionized firms (table C1).  
The coefficient to the indicator variable for Ivorians shows that Ivorians earn a much higher 
income at the lower quantiles than non-Ivorians, conditional on workers that are employed in 
non-unionized enterprises.  The premium to Ivorians is as high as 52 percent at the 25
th quantile.  
In enterprises with some degree of unionization, Ivorian is insignificant except at the top 
quantiles (75
th and 90
th) where it becomes statistically significant and negative.  This suggests 
that union-membership or union presence at a work-site protects non-Ivorian workers from wage 
discrimination.  Then, non-Ivorian workers who earn low wages (given other measured 
characteristics)—maybe, perhaps, due to a low degree of motivation, reliability, or other 
unobservable characteristics—are, therefore, pushed by non-Ivorian unions towards the average 
income class.  Undoubtedly, this group is primarily (if not solely) comprised of other African 
                                                                                                                                                             
19 Manager includes both management, supervisors, and foremen. However, if one looks at management only, the 
heterogeneity still prevails. 
20 See Borjas (1996).  Maloney and Ribeiro (1999) find similar results for Mexico.  
21 Given the low number of observations, we face some limitations.  Therefore, in what follows, we concentrate on 
robust results. 16 
nationalities and does not include, say, French citizens.  This group probably belongs in the top 
of the distribution that leads to the reverse in the sign.
22 
Just as union was insignificant when all workers were included in the regressions, density 
turns out insignificant here, except at the 90
th quantile where it is significantly negative.  This 
hardly suggests any union power in the wage bargaining process—a surprising result that 
supports our previous findings in section 5.1.  Union power can, as mentioned in the last section, 
have different shades.  If it does not affect wages directly, maybe it has power along various 
other dimensions—one of them seemed to be to protect non-Ivorians in the lower end of the 
wage distribution as we discussed previously.  Other channels may be tenure, profit per 
employee, or occupational group, each of which we will consider in turn in the following. 
Tenure:  As mentioned in the introduction to this section, with respect to 0-5 years of 
tenure, we find 6-12 years of tenure (tenure2) to be statistically significant (at least at the 10-15 
percent significance level) for the 10
th-50
th quantiles in the regressions for unionized firms and 
generally insignificant and/or with lower premium in the non-unionized firm regressions.  This 
may suggest that career paths in the unionized world are more rigid, following rules of 
promotion and wage increases that are based on tenure and not so much individual performance.  
However, the story could also simply be that certain enterprises tend to train their employees 
more, and the same enterprises happen to have some degree of unionization.  Neither story can 
be ruled out.  Whether unionized firms train their workers more than non-unionized firms is 
difficult to tell given the low number of workers who have received training.  However, as table 
A1 suggests, this may be the case. 
Profit per employee:  In the unionized firm regressions, the profit per employee is 
significantly positive across the entire distribution (the coefficient is very low though, about 
1.1E-08), while it is insignificant across the entire distribution for non-unionized firms.  This 
indicates that union power leads to profit-sharing, and thus, indirectly, unions may affect wages. 
Occupation:  The occupational groups have a vast impact on wages in the unionized 
firms, while they generally have a much smaller and often insignificant impact on wages in non-
unionized firms.  A priori, one would expect such a pattern, and it may be taken as evidence of 
union power that results in more rigid wage patterns between groups.  Thus, the between-
                                                 
22 No quantile regressions were run with the three groups—Ivorians, other Africans, and other nationalities—since 
this would lead to too few observations in certain brackets.  17 
(occupational)-group heterogeneity seems to originate, at least partly, from the presence of 
unions, and it shows the result of the detailed grid wage bargaining that takes place in RCI. 
What about the within-(occupational)-group heterogeneity?  One would expect it to be 
less pronounced in the unionized enterprises since unions tend to average out differences.  This 
does not seem to be the case here, though, as becomes evident when looking at the distribution of 
coefficients across quantiles for each occupational group (figure C1).  The occupational 
coefficients vary much more across quantiles for workers in unionized enterprises than they do 
for workers in non-unionized enterprises, which indicate a higher degree of within-group 
heterogeneity.  Not only are the coefficients higher and more significant for workers in unionized 
enterprises, they also vary much more.  This is surprising, and does not conform to a high degree 
of union power. 
 
5.3. Establishment-size effects 
The preceding paragraph suggests that union power particularly affect tenure.  In the 
literature, tenure has also been associated with establishment-size premiums; that is, that larger 
firms pay higher wages to their workers as compared to observationally equivalent workers in 
smaller establishments.
23  The question here is whether unions succeed in negotiating a higher 
job security, which results in longer tenure, or whether the long tenure arises because large 
establishments pay relatively higher wages, which results in a low turn-over rate?  Unfortunately, 
this cannot be analyzed in depth by the data at hand.  
That establishment-size effects may play a very large role in Côte d’Ivoire seems likely 
given our previous results that suggest intrinsic differences between small and large firms.  A 
Mann-Whitney test for whether the individual earnings for workers employed in firms with less 
than 40 employees are equal to firms with 40 employees or more, strongly rejects the hypothesis 
of equality.  On this basis, we split up the sample once more.
24  The results so far (section 6.1) 
show a non-linear relationship in firm-size premiums where small firms (17-40 employees) at 
some quantiles receive a greater size-premium than medium size firms (41-99 employees).  That 
                                                 
23 For LDCs see Schaffner (1998) and Velenchik (1997).  
24 An alternative would be to simply include interaction-effects between variables.  Since this, however, would not 
lend the same flexibility for all coefficients to vary (except if interaction terms are included for every single 
variable), we choose not to do that.  18 
we choose to cut the sample at firm size 40 is, therefore, based more on considerations related to 
equal size of sub-samples since we have relatively few observations. 
The results indicate that, indeed, tenure may be strongly related to establishment-size 
effects (see table D1).  Tenure is more often significant and generally receives a higher premium 
in large firms (40 or more employees) after controlling for union density.  Thus, it could be that 
unions just happen to be more present in large establishments and that these pay an employer-
size wage effect that lead to a lower degree of turn-over. 
Union density enters significantly positive in the small-establishment regressions at the 
lower quantiles (10
th and 25
th), while it enters significantly negative at the upper quantiles in the 
large-establishment regressions.  The first result corresponds to what one would expect and 
indicates that unions protect the low-income workers who, given measured human capital and 
other variables, are in the low end of the income distribution.  These workers are pushed upwards 
by the union.  For the upper quantiles, though, why would anybody be a union member if the 
pay-off is negative?  An explanation could be that job security increases, which also partly may 
explain the difference between tenure premiums in large vs. small firms, since large firms tend to 
be more unionized. 
Why does the employer size-wage effect occur?  A number of explanations have been 
discussed in the literature.  It could simply be an efficient market-determined pay-back to 
inferior working conditions.  Why, then, should working conditions be more inferior in large 
establishments?  One explanation is that larger firms may have to hire workers from a 
geographically broader area, which will increase commuting costs. Unfortunately, we do not 
have data to control for this.  However, it seems highly unlikely that this should be the whole 
story.
25  
The market-based explanation of the employer-size wage effect is probably not enough.  
Other economic explanations include problems and costs associated with monitoring shirking, 
hiring costs, and costs connected with the screening of applicants combined with the need for 
high quality workers.  Non-economic explanations have also been launched.  A sociological 
explanation is that an excessive wage will increase the morale and will be viewed as a gift that 
must be paid back.  A political explanation argues that large firms want to maintain some 19 
monopoly power and be on good footing with local government representatives.  Of these 
possible explanations, the shirking and/or turnover explanations may be the most promising, but 
why should these costs increase with firm size?  Higher capital-labor ratios, more sophisticated 
technology, higher ratios of workers to owners, and deeper hierarchies in larger establishments 
may increase costs of monitoring, hiring, training, screening or failing to obtain workers of high 
quality.  
Another almost “stylized fact” in the literature is that the establishment-size effect on 
wages is higher for white-collar than blue-collar workers.
26  T h i s  i s  a l s o  t h e  c a s e  f o r  C ô t e  
d’Ivoire.  When we run quantile regressions for white-collar workers and blue-collar workers 
separately and include firm40 as the only firm-size dummy, the result that emerges is consistent 
with the literature (see figure D1).  This pattern can also be explained by the efficiency wage 
story if it is harder to monitor white-collar workers; if they are more prone to quitting their job 
voluntarily; or if white-collar workers receive more (firm-specific) training than blue-collar 
workers.  With the data at hand, we cannot verify nor reject these possibilities. 
The bottom line is that part of what appears to be union power probably can be explained 
by establishment-size effects, and that both have a non-negligible effect on wages. 
 
6.4 Spillover effects from unionized to non-unionized establishments 
The explanation for the absence of a positive union/non-union wage differential could be 
that wages secured by unionized workers spill-over to raise wages in establishments that are not 
unionized.  Pencavel (1995) set up a model that control for this possibility.  He introduces three 
sectors, only one of which is unionized.  In addition to the unionized sector, there is another 
relatively high wage sector that is influenced by wage-setting practices in the unionized sector.  
Firms in this sector may pay high wages to discourage unionization or to reduce turnover.   
Lastly, there is a third sector, which is not influenced by the unionized sector, and where wages 
are low. 
According to this model, unions raise wages not only for their members but also for the 
high-wage non-unionized workers indirectly influenced by the union negotiations.  This leads to 
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conditions.  This seems fruitless since establishments with more than 100 employees surely all have these facilities 
(in compliance with the findings of Velenchik). 20 
an important insight:  the premium received by unions is not mirrored in the wage differential 
between the unionized and non-unionized high-wage sectors.  In the absence of unions, wages in 
both these sectors would decrease and employment in the two sectors would increase, while the 
third low-wage sector would remain unaffected. 
In the analysis above, we have not included such a third sector since the data do not allow 
it.  Instead, we have what can be considered as the two high-wage sectors.  Hence, to the extent 
that such a spillover effect exists, our measure of the impact from unions must be considered a 
lower bound, since any such spillover effect will lead to a downward bias in the returns to 
unionization. 
The idea of a third sector may also explain part of the establishment-size wage effect 
since, presumably, small non-unionized firms are less prone to have their wage setting tied to the 
wage setting in the unionized firms.  This does not explain the difference between the premium 
to blue vs. white-collar workers that we observed above and, hence, cannot be the only reason 
for the establishment size wage effects. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Summary of findings 
The objective of this paper has been to analyze possible channels of distortions in the 
labor markets in Côte d’Ivoire by using enterprise micro-level data.  The tool kit used is the 
technique of quantile regressions, which has proven its usefulness by providing a much more 
detailed analysis across the distribution than least square techniques could have accomplished.  
The main findings are the following: 
(1)  Basic education:  The wage premium related to basic education is insignificant across 
all quantiles when the entire sample is used as well as for all sub-samples. 
(2)  Higher education:  The wage premium from higher education is very significant and 
positive at all quantiles for all sub-samples, except for firms with less than 40 employees, and the 
premium is relatively high. 
(3)  Occupational groups:  The effect from occupational groups on wages, on the other 
hand, are generally very significant, and the heterogeneity both within and between these groups 
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collar workers include managers, adm/sales, and tech/maintenance. 21 
is found to be substantial, and much larger in unionized enterprises than non-unionized, a finding 
that questions the actual power of unions. 
(4)  Union:  Union power does not seem to influence wages directly.  Union is 
insignificant in the analysis that includes all observations.  When unionized firms are analyzed 
separately, and a proxy for the degree of unionization is included, the proxy (density) turns out to 
be statistically insignificant.  Union influence and power seem mostly to come through tenure.  
Tenure is very important in unionized enterprises and not at all so in non-unionized enterprises.  
Union power also seems to be protecting “vulnerable” minorities in the Ivorian society—
probably mostly “other Africans.” 
The union-premium may be significantly higher if there is a spill-over effect to the non-
unionized firms included in our sample, since this will bias the union premium downwards.  Data 
that include manufacturing firms along with more informal sector firms are welcomed to cast 
light over this issue. 
(5) Establishment-size:  Effects from establishment size on wages are pronounced.   
Workers with comparable observable human capital characteristics earn widely different wages, 
depending on firm size (in a non-linear fashion).  The effect is found much higher for white-
collar workers than for blue-collar workers.  Both results are in sync with the literature, and may 
be explained by efficiency wage considerations. 
As previously mentioned, these results do not extend to the entire economy but only hold 
for the limited and highly selected group of workers employed in the manufacturing sector. 
 
Policy implications and recommendations 
Basic education is not sufficient, and does not lead to higher wages among the “golden 
league” of workers that the manufacturing sector employees constitute.  But since both high 
education and occupational groups are found very important in generating personal income, 
formal education is highly recommendable, but should go beyond basic education.  Intellectual 
capital is important, and more of it may lead to a reduction in wage inequality. 
Further, setting aside for a moment the possible significant spill-over effects from 
unionized to non-unionized firms (and hence downward bias in the union premium), labor 
market distortions do not seem to be of primary concern in the manufacturing sector.  The 
unions show no sign of “monopoly union” power, where—in the extreme case—the unions quote 22 
the wages.  Instead, unions seem more concerned with maintaining and securing jobs.  However, 
unions do lead to inefficiency if the payback to tenure represents rigidly enforced seniority-based 
promotions that are not based on an increase in the actual level of human capital.  This may well 
be the case since, presumably, if they were based on human capital considerations, tenure would 
also turn out important in non-unionized enterprises. 
A part of the story about tenure, however, is probably related to efficiency wage 
considerations related to establishment-size wage effects.  This means that, even in the absence 
of unions, segmentation and inefficiencies will still be present as long as firms seek to retain 
their employees by paying wages above the market clearing level.  Education will, in this case, 
also improve the income distribution through efficiency wage channels, reducing the individual 
firm’s transferable human capital investment which, according to this theory, will reduce the 
efficiency wage premium. 
In any event, the recent decentralization and introduction of enterprise-level bargaining 
will make it more difficult for union confederations to pursue any aggressive rent-seeking 
policies, and will reduce the degree to which collective bargaining is politicized.  Hence, this 
policy should be further encouraged. 23 
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Appendix A 
 
Table A1. Basic descriptive statistics 
All  union members  not  union members  french-lebanese   not french- lebanese   firm size ≥ 40 empl  firm size < 40 empl   
freq perc freq perc freq perc freq perc freq perc freq perc freq perc 
all 
Ivorian 
other african 
other nation 
 
not union 
union 
 
yrgroup1 (15-25 yrs) 
yrgroup2 (26-45 yrs) 
yrgroup3 (46-65 yrs) 
 
tenure1 (0-5 yrs) 
tenure2 (6-12 yrs) 
tenure3 (more than 12 yrs) 
 
edunone (no education) 
edubasic (basic education) 
eduhigh (higher education) 
 
manager 
administration/sales 
technicians/maintenance  
qualified production workers 
support staff 
 
not french-lebanese owned 
french-lebanese owned 
 
year 95 
year 96 
 
firm size < 40 employees 
firm size ≥ 40 employees 
 
never received training 
received training 
 
food industry 
textile industry 
wood industry 
metal industry 
other industry/not stated 
891 
704 
173 
14 
 
395 
496 
 
87 
679 
125 
 
412 
245 
234 
 
223 
503 
165 
 
114 
136 
88 
281 
272 
 
426 
465 
 
579 
312 
 
363 
528 
 
832 
57 
 
216 
109 
232 
263 
71 
100.0 
79.0 
19.4 
1.6 
 
44.3 
55.7 
 
9.8 
76.2 
14.0 
 
46.2 
27.5 
26.3 
 
25.0 
56.5 
18.5 
 
12.8 
15.3 
9.9 
31.5 
30.5 
 
47.8 
52.2 
 
65.0 
35.0 
 
40.7 
59.3 
 
93.6 
6.4 
 
24.2 
12.2 
26.0 
29.5 
8.0 
496 
416 
79 
1 
 
NA 
NA 
 
18 
395 
83 
 
167 
177 
152 
 
94 
316 
86 
 
65 
79 
58 
167 
127 
 
182 
314 
 
307 
189 
 
114 
382 
 
456 
38 
 
122 
30 
120 
192 
32 
100.0 
83.9 
15.9 
0.2 
 
NA 
NA 
 
3.6 
79.6 
16.7 
 
33.7 
35.7 
30.7 
 
19.0 
63.7 
17.3 
 
13.1 
15.9 
11.7 
33.7 
25.6 
 
36.7 
63.3 
 
61.9 
38.1 
 
23.0 
77.0 
 
92.3 
7.7 
 
24.6 
6.1 
24.2 
38.7 
6.5 
395 
288 
94 
13 
 
NA 
NA 
 
69 
284 
42 
 
245 
68 
82 
 
129 
187 
79 
 
49 
57 
30 
114 
145 
 
244 
151 
 
272 
123 
 
249 
146 
 
376 
19 
 
94 
79 
112 
71 
39 
100.0 
72.9 
23.8 
3.3 
 
NA 
NA 
 
17.5 
71.9 
10.6 
 
62.0 
17.2 
20.8 
 
32.7 
47.3 
20.0 
 
12.4 
14.4 
7.6 
28.9 
36.7 
 
61.8 
38.2 
 
68.9 
31.1 
 
63.0 
37.0 
 
95.2 
4.8 
 
23.8 
20.0 
28.4 
18.0 
9.9 
465 
380 
72 
13 
 
151 
314 
 
18 
374 
73 
 
177 
141 
147 
 
88 
295 
82 
 
66 
76 
57 
147 
119 
 
NA 
NA 
 
217 
248 
 
163 
302 
 
431 
32 
 
76 
32 
97 
218 
42 
100.0 
81.7 
15.5 
2.8 
 
32.5 
67.5 
 
3.9 
80.4 
15.7 
 
38.1 
30.3 
31.6 
 
18.9 
63.4 
17.6 
 
14.2 
16.3 
12.3 
31.6 
25.6 
 
NA 
NA 
 
46.5 
53.5 
 
35.0 
65.0 
 
93.1 
6.9 
 
16.3 
6.9 
20.9 
46.9 
9.0 
426 
324 
101 
1 
 
244 
182 
 
69 
305 
52 
 
235 
104 
87 
 
135 
208 
83 
 
48 
60 
31 
134 
153 
 
NA 
NA 
 
362 
64 
 
200 
226 
 
401 
25 
 
140 
77 
135 
45 
29 
100.0 
76.1 
23.7 
0.2 
 
57.3 
42.7 
 
16.2 
71.6 
12.2 
 
55.2 
24.4 
20.4 
 
31.7 
48.8 
19.5 
 
11.3 
14.1 
7.3 
31.5 
35.9 
 
NA 
NA 
 
85.0 
15.0 
 
47.0 
53.0 
 
94.1 
5.9 
 
32.9 
18.1 
31.7 
10.6 
6.8 
528 
445 
77 
6 
 
146 
382 
 
20 
424 
84 
 
191 
159 
178 
 
94 
313 
121 
 
83 
90 
61 
154 
140 
 
226 
302 
 
319 
209 
 
NA 
NA 
 
478 
48 
 
121 
68 
133 
172 
34 
100.0 
84.3 
14.6 
1.1 
 
27.7 
72.4 
 
3.8 
80.3 
15.9 
 
36.2 
30.1 
33.7 
 
17.8 
59.3 
22.9 
 
15.7 
17.1 
11.6 
29.2 
26.5 
 
42.8 
57.2 
 
60.4 
39.6 
 
NA 
NA 
 
90.9 
9.1 
 
22.9 
12.9 
25.2 
32.6 
6.4 
363 
259 
96 
8 
 
249 
114 
 
67 
255 
41 
 
221 
86 
56 
 
129 
190 
44 
 
31 
46 
27 
127 
132 
 
200 
163 
 
260 
103 
 
NA 
NA 
 
354 
9 
 
95 
41 
99 
91 
37 
100.0 
71.4 
26.5 
2.2 
 
68.6 
31.4 
 
18.5 
70.3 
11.3 
 
60.9 
23.7 
15.4 
 
35.5 
52.3 
12.1 
 
8.5 
12.7 
7.4 
35.0 
36.4 
 
55.1 
44.9 
 
71.6 
28.4 
 
NA 
NA 
 
97.5 
2.5 
 
26.2 
11.3 
27.3 
25.1 
10.2 26 
 
Table A2. Summary Statistics, workers 
all  union  non union  french/lebanese  non french/lebanese  variable 
mean std mean std mean std mean std mean std 
monthly wages, all 
   managers 
   adm/sales 
   tech/main 
   qual. prod work. 
   support staff 
 
firm size (# empl) 
value added/empl 
export share 
union density 
(share in union) 
128,766 
263,112 
189,978 
191,142 
85,326 
66,551 
 
169.4 
3,927,864 
24.75 
0.54 
186,957 
278,876 
239,870 
217,369 
88,393 
117,809 
 
535.1 
8,088,673 
34.83 
0.42 
 
124,113 
202,863 
179,938 
168,669 
94,225 
68,034 
 
211.4 
3,106,221 
27.47 
0.84 
131,001 
133,901 
206,101 
167,471 
78,587 
27,767 
 
675.4 
6,661,085 
36.43 
0.23 
134,610 
343,035 
203,893 
234,590 
72,290 
65,252 
 
116.6 
4,959,597 
21.30 
0.16 
239,443 
384,378 
281,428 
289,238 
99,998 
159,504 
 
262.1 
9,493,680 
32.39 
0.26 
159,452 
287,760 
226,934 
237,032 
98,888 
82,846 
 
136.9 
4,110,592 
26.11 
0.68 
224,500 
311,371 
269,796 
255,823 
95,624 
174,940 
 
187.7 
7,526,535 
35.17 
0.37 
95,271 
229,222 
143,167 
106,762 
70,448 
53,877 
 
204.82 
3,728,407 
23.24 
0.40 
126,553 
225,555 
187,447 
59,159 
77,364 
24,840 
 
747.5 
8,665,307 
34.42 
0.42 
 
Table A3. Summary Statistics, enterprises 
All  french/lebanese  not french/lebanese  firm size ≥ 40  firm size < 40  variable 
mean std mean std mean std mean std mean std 
export share 
value added/empl 
union density 
(share in union) 
21.8 
3,350,537 
 
0.42 
34.7 
8,165,914 
 
0.44 
31.4 
4,312,062 
 
0.65 
38.3 
8,378,298 
 
0.40 
15.3 
2,713,682 
 
0.26 
30.7 
8,013,524 
 
0.40 
40.24 
3,769,156 
 
0.68 
40.00 
7,596,123 
 
0.38 
4.48 
2,957,289 
 
0.17 
15.09 
8,707,023 
 
0.34 
 
Table A4.  
edunone edubasic eduhigh   
freq perc freq perc freq perc 
all 
   tenure1 
   tenure2 
   tenure3 
 
   training 
   no training 
223 
117 
54 
 52 
 
5 
217 
100.00 
52.47 
24.22 
23.32 
 
2.25 
97.75 
503 
205 
149 
149 
 
36 
466 
100.00 
40.76 
29.62 
29.62 
 
7.17 
92.83 
165 
90 
42 
33 
 
16 
149 
100.00 
54.55 
25.45 
20.00 
 
9.70 
90.30 27 
 
 
 
 
Table A5. Some percentiles and ratio’s of percentiles for monthly wages 
percentiles and ratio’s  all  union  non-union  french/lebane  not french/leb  firm size ≥ 40  firm size < 40 
percentiles 
10 
50 
90 
ratio’s 
50/10 
90/10 
90/50 
 
36,000 
75,000 
236,798 
 
2.08 
6.58 
3.16 
 
46,000 
90,000 
220,294 
 
1.96 
4.79 
2.45 
 
28,100 
60,000 
276,073 
 
2.14 
9.82 
4.60 
 
49,355 
92,683 
278,049 
 
1.88 
5.63 
3.00 
 
29,268 
58,537 
195,122 
 
2.00 
6.67 
3.33 
 
46,406 
92,683 
270,732 
 
2.00 
5.83 
2.92 
 
29,561 
58,537 
158,702 
 
1.98 
5.37 
2.71 
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Figure A1. Distribution of real monthly wage, various groups 
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Appendix B, General results (using the entire sample) 
 
Table B1. Quantile regressions and OLS, all observations 
n=891  quantile regressions  OLS 
  0.1  0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90     
  coef pvalue  coef pvalue  coef pvalue  coef pvalue  coef pvalue  coef pvalue 
constant 
individual 
characteristics 
yrgroup2 
yrgroup3 
Ivorian 
union 
edubasic 
eduhigh 
tenure2 
tenure3 
french/leban 
occupation 
manager 
adm/sales 
tech/mainten 
qualified prod. 
industry 
food 
wood 
metal 
other/no stated 
firm size 
small firm 
medium firm 
large firm  
 
value added 
year dummy 
(1996=1) 
9.3556 
 
 
0.4546 
0.5529 
0.0980 
0.0193 
-1.5E-8 
0.2825 
0.0324 
0.2727 
0.1070 
 
0.6907 
0.2300 
0.3607 
0.1542 
 
0.1125 
0.1384 
0.3006 
0.1667 
 
0.3477 
0.1334 
0.4067 
 
1.1E-8 
0.1111 
0.000
d 
 
 
0.002
 d 
0.001
 d 
0.166 
0.739 
1.000 
0.018
c 
0.650 
0.000
 d 
0.071
 b 
 
0.000
 d 
0.031
 c 
0.001
 d 
0.018
 c 
 
0.383 
0.267 
0.008
 d 
0.213 
 
0.000
 d 
0.251 
0.000
 d 
 
0.000
 d 
0.126
 a 
9.7860 
 
 
0.2257 
0.3434 
0.1763 
0.0192 
0.0494 
0.4001 
0.0684 
0.2461 
0.1348 
 
0.5443 
0.2842 
0.3417 
0.0689 
 
0.0615 
0.0550 
0.1411 
0.0169
 c 
 
0.2975 
0.2270 
0.3572 
 
1.1E-8 
0.1808 
0.000
 d 
 
 
0.033
 c 
0.002
 d 
0.002
 d 
0.663 
0.337 
0.000
 d 
0.204 
0.000
 d 
0.001
 d 
 
0.000
 d 
0.002
 d 
0.000
 d 
0.127
 a 
 
0.454 
0.455 
0.057
b 
0.855 
 
0.000
 d 
0.002
 d 
0.000
 d 
 
0.001
 d 
0.001
 d 
10.0287 
 
 
0.2198 
0.3868 
0.0921 
-0.0645 
0.0621 
0.5569 
0.1265 
0.2039 
0.1425 
 
0.7100 
0.4467 
0.5996 
0.1515 
 
0.2300 
0.0968 
0.1941 
0.0205 
 
0.2439 
0.2481 
0.2930 
 
8.0E-9 
0.1943 
0.000
 d 
 
 
0.002
 d 
0.000 
d 
0.149 
a 
0.303 
0.270 
0.000
 d 
0.055
 b 
0.002
 d 
0.022
 c 
 
0.000
 d 
0.000
 d 
0.000
 d 
0.002
 d 
 
0.004
 d 
0.210 
0.007
 d 
0.864 
 
0.002
 d 
0.008
 d 
0.000
 d 
 
0.012
 c 
0.000
 d 
10.2785 
 
 
0.2442 
0.3756 
-0.0143 
-0.1441 
0.0503 
0.6310 
0.0572 
0.1861 
0.2277 
 
0.9154 
0.6524 
0.7028 
0.1272 
 
0.2718 
0.1290 
0.2099 
0.1877 
 
0.3523 
0.4127 
0.3996 
 
1.1E-8 
0.1901 
0.000
 d 
 
 
0.000
 d 
0.000
 d 
0.821 
0.056
 b 
0.368 
0.000
 d 
0.347 
0.010
 d 
0.000
 d 
 
0.000
 d 
0.000
 d 
0.000
 d 
0.000
 d 
 
0.000
 d 
0.060
 b 
0.005
 d 
0.047
 c 
 
0.000
 d 
0.000
 d 
0.000
 d 
 
0.002
 d 
0.001
 d 
10.5778 
 
 
0.2238 
0.3650 
-0.1838 
-0.0812 
0.0927 
0.7155 
-0.1067 
0.0541 
0.2075 
 
1.1033 
0.6715 
0.7461 
0.2009 
 
0.2954 
0.1877 
0.2459 
0.1524 
 
0.5534 
0.5323 
0.5272 
 
1.0E-8 
0.2382 
0.000
 d 
 
 
0.024
 c 
0.008
 d 
0.199 
0.352 
0.261 
0.002
 d 
0.245 
0.600 
0.017
 c 
 
0.000
 d 
0.000
 d 
0.000
 d 
0.022
 c 
 
0.002
 d 
0.040
 c 
0.033
 c 
0.293 
 
0.000
 d 
0.000
 d 
0.000
 d 
 
0.101
 a 
0.012
 c 
 
9.9651 
 
 
0.2732 
0.4473 
-0.0426 
-0.0868 
0.1077 
0.6208 
0.0585 
0.1831 
0.1448 
 
0.7401 
0.4780 
0.5750 
0.1430 
 
0.1856 
0.1121 
0.2629 
0.1317 
 
0.4012 
0.3327 
0.4956 
 
1.2E-8 
0.1981 
 
0.000
 d 
 
 
0.000
 d 
0.000
 d 
0.408 
0.074
 b 
0.042
 c 
0.000
 d 
0.249 
0.001
 d 
0.003
 d 
 
0.000
 d 
0.000
 d 
0.000
 d 
0.005
 d 
 
0.009
 d 
0.114
a 
0.000
 d 
0.151 
 
0.000
 d 
0.000
 d 
0.000
 d 
 
0.000
 d 
0.000
 d 
Note: a—significance at the 15% level; b—10%; c—5%; d—1%. 
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Table B2. Tests of equality of coefficients across quantiles, all observations 
Tests are one-sided t-tests, H0: coefficient(QA) = coefficient(QB).  The t-statistic is 
given as the numerical value.  Data are pooled over the two years 1995 and 1996 and are 
for men only. 
a-significant at the 15% level 
b-significant at the 10% level 
c-significant at the  5% level 
d-significant at the  1% level 
  yrgroup2 yrgroup3  Ivorian  union 
QA Q B  t-stat p-value t-stat p-value t-stat p-value t-stat p-value 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.25 
0.25 
0.25 
0.50 
0.50 
0.75 
0.25 
0.50 
0.75 
0.90 
0.50 
0.75 
0.90 
0.75 
0.90 
0.90 
3.23 
2.70 
1.88 
2.01 
0.00 
0.03 
0.00 
0.15 
0.00 
0.05 
0.0363
c 
0.0504
b 
0.0855
b 
0.0783
b 
0.4753 
0.4343 
0.4943 
0.3471 
0.4841 
0.4149 
2.04 
0.92 
0.95 
0.93 
0.14 
0.05 
0.02 
0.01 
0.02 
0.01 
0.0768
b 
0.1688 
0.1645 
0.1677 
0.3519 
0.4125 
0.4508 
0.4540 
0.4413 
0.4657 
1.29 
0.01 
1.46 
3.27 
1.86 
6.44 
6.19 
2.62 
3.88 
1.90 
0.1283
a 
0.4712 
0.1135
a 
0.0355
c 
0.0866
b 
0.0057
d 
0.0065 
0.0529
b 
0.0246
c 
0.0842
b 
0.00 
1.16 
3.50 
0.93 
2.19 
4.68 
1.17 
1.50 
0.03 
0.65 
0.4995 
0.1408
a 
0.0309
c 
0.1682 
0.0696
b 
0.0154
c 
0.1401
a 
0.1107
a 
0.4271 
0.2105 
 
  edubasic eduhigh  tenure2  tenure3 
QA Q B  t-stat p-value t-stat p-value t-stat p-value t-stat p-value 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.25 
0.25 
0.25 
0.50 
0.50 
0.75 
0.25 
0.50 
0.75 
0.90 
0.50 
0.75 
0.90 
0.75 
0.90 
0.90 
0.62 
0.78 
0.40 
0.81 
0.06 
0.00 
0.22 
0.04 
0.13 
0.43 
0.2149 
0.1888 
0.2625 
0.1841 
0.4038 
0.4943 
0.3195 
0.4165 
0.3580 
0.2550 
1.29 
3.66 
6.51 
2.95 
2.07 
3.91 
1.83 
0.41 
0.47 
0.19 
0.1281
a 
0.0281
c 
0.0055
d 
0.0432
c 
0.0752
b 
0.0242
c 
0.0880
b 
0.2604 
0.2464 
0.3327 
0.35 
1.28 
0.09 
1.65 
0.93 
0.03 
3.26 
1.29 
5.84 
4.14 
0.2784 
0.1287
a 
0.3804 
0.0999
b 
0.1681 
0.4338 
0.0358
c 
0.1281
a 
0.0080
d 
0.0211
c 
0.21 
0.73 
0.99 
3.94 
0.58 
0.79 
3.32 
0.07 
2.09 
2.22 
0.3253 
0.1971 
0.1598 
0.0238
c 
0.2234 
0.1875 
0.0344
c 
0.3932 
0.0744
b 
0.0681
b 
 
  manager admsales techmain  qprod 
QA Q B  t-stat p-value t-stat p-value t-stat p-value t-stat p-value 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.25 
0.25 
0.25 
0.50 
0.50 
0.75 
0.25 
0.50 
0.75 
0.90 
0.50 
0.75 
0.90 
0.75 
0.90 
0.90 
1.11 
0.01 
1.60 
3.07 
2.36 
11.21 
8.21 
3.96 
4.29 
1.23 
0.1464
a 
0.4563 
0.1030
a 
0.0401
c 
0.0623
b 
0.0004
d 
0.0022
d 
0.0234
c 
0.0193
c 
0.1343
a 
0.32 
3.32 
13.65 
5.98 
2.62 
12.69 
4.96 
6.04 
2.19 
0.02 
0.2847 
0.0344
c 
0.0001
d 
0.0074
d 
0.0528
b 
0.0002
d 
0.0131
c 
0.0071
d 
0.0698
b 
0.4398 
0.03 
4.49 
4.46 
4.47 
8.34 
6.52 
6.59 
0.70 
1.00 
0.09 
0.4272 
0.0172
c 
0.0176
c 
0.0174
c 
0.0020
d 
0.0054
d 
0.0052
d 
0.2018 
0.1586 
0.3832 
2.12 
0.00 
0.11 
0.19 
2.69 
0.73 
1.89 
0.21 
0.34 
1.13 
0.0731
b 
0.4842 
0.3675 
0.3301 
0.0508
b 
0.1963 
0.0846
b 
0.3228 
0.2790 
0.1440
a 
 
  yeard96 franlib valadper smallf 
QA Q B  t-stat p-value t-stat p-value t-stat p-value t-stat p-value 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.25 
0.25 
0.25 
0.50 
0.50 
0.75 
0.25 
0.50 
0.75 
0.90 
0.50 
0.75 
0.90 
0.75 
0.90 
0.90 
1.21 
1.17 
0.79 
1.14 
0.07 
0.02 
0.29 
0.01 
0.23 
0.33 
0.1356
a 
0.1399
a 
0.1875 
0.1428
a 
0.3978 
0.4443 
0.2944 
0.4707 
0.3154 
0.2831 
0.22 
0.20 
2.37 
0.99 
0.02 
2.32 
0.64 
1.64 
0.45 
0.07 
0.3214 
0.3276 
0.0622
b 
0.1604 
0.4431 
0.0642
b 
0.2123 
0.1002
a 
0.2508 
0.3954 
0.06 
0.77 
0.04 
0.02 
0.79 
0.00 
0.00 
0.59 
0.13 
0.00 
0.4020 
0.1902 
0.4215 
0.4437 
0.1865 
0.4900 
0.4833 
0.2216 
0.3587 
0.4868 
0.32 
0.96 
0.00 
1.83 
0.52 
0.34 
3.33 
1.82 
5.60 
2.77 
0.2848 
0.1639 
0.4844 
0.0883
b 
0.2352 
0.2792 
0.0341
c 
0.0890
b 
0.0091
d 
0.0482
c  
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Table B2 (continued). Tests of equality of coefficients across quantiles, all 
observations 
Tests are one-sided t-tests, H0: coefficient(QA) = coefficient(QB).  The t-statistic is 
given as the numerical value.  Data are pooled over the two years 1995 and 1996 and are 
for men only. 
a-significant at the 15% level 
b-significant at the 10% level 
c-significant at the  5% level 
d-significant at the  1% level 
 
  mediumf largef  food  wood 
QA Q B  t-stat p-value t-stat p-value t-stat p-value t-stat p-value 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.25 
0.25 
0.25 
0.50 
0.50 
0.75 
0.25 
0.50 
0.75 
0.90 
0.50 
0.75 
0.90 
0.75 
0.90 
0.90 
0.81 
0.74 
4.44 
6.48 
0.07 
4.11 
5.71 
4.17 
4.45 
1.12 
0.1840 
0.1944 
0.0178
c 
0.0056
d 
0.3982 
0.0215
c 
0.0086
d 
0.0207
c 
0.0176
c 
0.1452
a 
0.39 
1.26 
0.00 
0.93 
0.76 
0.19 
1.94 
1.94 
3.99 
1.53 
0.2651 
0.1308
a 
0.4734 
0.1680 
0.1913 
0.3333 
0.0819
b 
0.0821
b 
0.0231
c 
0.1085
a 
0.17 
0.74 
1.25 
1.45 
4.68 
5.35 
4.07 
0.32 
0.39 
0.07 
0.3387 
0.1956 
0.1316
a 
0.1144
a 
0.0154
c 
0.0105
c 
0.0219
c 
0.2849 
0.2670 
0.3980 
0.49 
0.11 
0.00 
0.11 
0.34 
0.80 
1.50 
0.20 
0.77 
0.41 
0.2411 
0.3724 
0.4722 
0.3710 
0.2805 
0.1858 
0.1108
a 
0.3282 
0.1902 
0.2600 
 
  metal other  industry    
QA Q B  t-stat p-value t-stat p-value         
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.25 
0.25 
0.25 
0.50 
0.50 
0.75 
0.25 
0.50 
0.75 
0.90 
0.50 
0.75 
0.90 
0.75 
0.90 
0.90 
2.34 
0.87 
0.53 
0.14 
0.61 
0.62 
0.67 
0.05 
0.19 
0.11 
0.0632
b 
0.1759 
0.2325 
0.3540 
0.2179 
0.2154 
0.2059 
0.4125 
0.3320 
0.3702 
1.40 
0.86 
0.02 
0.01 
0.00 
2.21 
0.72 
2.32 
0.66 
0.08 
0.1182
a 
0.1770 
0.4454 
0.4696 
0.4870 
0.0689
b 
0.1977 
0.0640
b 
0.2091 
0.3918 
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Figure B1 
manager, 90% CI band (bootstrapped 200)
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Appendix C, Results when splitting union and non-union members 
 
Table C1. Regression results, Workers in unionized firms. 
n=634  quantile regressions  OLS 
# firms=68  0.1  0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90     
  coef pvalue  coef pvalue  coef pvalue  coef pvalue  coef pvalue  coef pvalue 
constant 
individual 
characteristics 
yrgroup2 
yrgroup3 
Ivorian 
union density 
edubasic 
eduhigh 
tenure2 
tenure3 
french/leban 
occupation 
manager 
adm/sales 
tech/mainten 
qualified prod. 
industry 
food 
wood 
metal 
other/no stated 
firm size 
small firm 
medium firm 
large firm  
 
value added 
year dummy  
9.8539 
 
 
0.0862 
0.2221 
0.0485 
-0.0735 
-0.0263 
0.4805 
0.1479 
0.3460 
0.0800 
 
0.5693 
0.2930 
0.2779 
0.1296 
 
0.1358 
0.1816 
0.3776 
0.2193 
 
0.2202 
-0.0130 
0.2816 
 
1.0E-8 
0.1551 
0.000
d 
 
 
0.453 
0.104
a 
0.540 
0.548 
0.694 
0.000
 d 
0.104
 a 
0.000
 d 
0252 
 
0.000
 d 
0.016
c 
0.017
 c 
0.097
b 
 
0.599 
0.472 
0.131
 a 
0.435 
 
0.122
 a 
0.929 
0.044
 c 
 
0.020
 c 
0.066
 b 
9.9580 
 
 
0.1034 
0.1807 
0.0493 
-0.0321 
1.3E-8 
0.5243 
0.0764 
0.2654 
0.0716 
 
06025 
0.3521 
0.2562 
0.1032 
 
0.2410 
0.1012 
0.2610 
0.1586 
 
0.3024 
0.0751 
0.3665 
 
1.3E-8 
0.2948 
0.000
 d 
 
 
0.254 
0.118
a 
0.490 
0.745 
1.000 
0.000
 d 
0.162 
0.000
 d 
0.127
 a 
 
0.000
 d 
0.000
 d 
0.004
 d 
0.024
 c 
 
0.045
 c 
0.373 
0.029
 c 
0.296 
 
0.009
 d 
0.520 
0.001
 d 
 
0.000
 d 
0.000
 d 
10.2771 
 
 
0.1685 
0.2735 
-0.0279 
-0.0299 
0.0136 
0.5309 
0.1972 
0.2568 
0.1244 
 
0.8250 
0.6199 
0.6087 
0.1676 
 
0.1581 
-0.0815 
0.0875 
0.1468 
 
0.2689 
0.1386 
0.2301 
 
8.3E-9 
0.2213 
0.000
 d 
 
 
0.053
 b 
0.032
 c 
0.758 
0.790 
0.797 
0.000
 d 
0.005
 d 
0.001
 d 
0.071
 b 
 
0.000
 d 
0.000
 d 
0.000
 d 
0.009
 d 
 
0.169 
0.444 
0.411 
0.391 
 
0.030
 c 
0.316 
0.067
 b 
 
0.031
 c 
0.000
 d 
10.5651 
 
 
0.1950 
0.3881 
-0.2590 
-0.0432 
0.0919 
0.6734 
0.0740 
0.2836 
0.0902 
 
1.0304 
0.8772 
0.6879 
0.2696 
 
0.3192 
0.1195 
0.1721 
0.3227 
 
0.2265 
0.1308 
0.1543 
 
1.0E-8 
0.1962 
0.000
 d 
 
 
0.191 
0.037
 c 
0.024
 c 
0.771 
0.172 
0.000
 d 
0.395 
0.004
 d 
0.291 
 
0.000
 d 
0.000
 d 
0.000
 d 
0.001
 d 
 
0.002
 d 
0.250 
0.082
 b 
0.016
 c 
 
0.099
 b 
0.411 
0.286 
 
0.055
 b 
0.005
 d 
10.7920 
 
 
0.3969 
0.5514 
-0.4328 
-0.4554 
0.1282 
0.7233 
-0.1449 
0.0811 
0.1359 
 
1.2901 
1.0357 
0.8715 
0.4232 
 
0.5583 
0.4199 
0.4128 
0.5641 
 
0.4744 
0.2837 
0.3661 
 
1.3E-8 
0.0919 
0.000
 d 
 
 
0.049
 c 
0.018
 c 
0.007
 d 
0.083
 b 
0.197 
0.001
 d 
0.294 
0.557 
0.194 
 
0.000
 d 
0.000
 d 
0.000
 d 
0.000
 d 
 
0.000
 d 
0.007
 d 
0.007
 d 
0.008
 d 
 
0.107
 a 
0.381 
0.240 
 
0.129
 a 
0.425 
10.2709 
 
 
0.2606 
0.4298 
-0.2119 
-0.1857 
0.1265 
0.7130 
0.0862 
0.2245 
0.1120 
 
0.8420 
0.6368 
0.5603 
0.2231 
 
0.2292 
0.1238 
0.2522 
0.2310 
 
0.2877 
0.0895 
0.2847 
 
1.2E-8 
0.2203 
0.000
 d 
 
 
0.021
 c 
0.001
 d 
0.002
 d 
0.080
 b 
0.057
 b 
0.000
 d 
0.165 
0.000
 d 
0.065
 b 
 
0.000
 d 
0.000
 d 
0.000
 d 
0.001
 d 
 
0.019
 c 
0.219 
0.010
 d 
0.082
 b 
 
0.009
 d 
0.414 
0.009
 d 
 
0.000
 d 
0.000
 d 
Workers in non-unionized firms. 
n=257  quantile regressions  OLS 
# firms=59  0.1  0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90     
  coef pvalue  coef pvalue  coef pvalue  coef pvalue  coef pvalue  coef pvalue 
constant 
individual 
characteristics 
yrgroup2 
yrgroup3 
Ivorian 
edubasic 
eduhigh 
tenure2 
tenure3 
french/leban 
occupation 
manager 
adm/sales 
tech/mainten 
qualified prod. 
industry 
food 
wood 
metal 
other/no stated 
firm size 
small firm 
medium firm 
large firm  
 
value added 
year dummy  
9.2417 
 
 
0.5072 
0.6670 
0.1598 
0.1034 
0.1324 
0.1636 
0.3528 
0.1949 
 
0.0203 
0.0310 
0.6118 
0.2064 
 
0.0316 
-0.0332 
0.2611 
0.1665 
 
0.2346 
0.3674 
0.7515 
 
1.3E-8 
-0.0336 
0.000
 d 
 
 
0.052
 b 
0.009
 d 
0.296 
0.476 
0.618 
0.378 
0.106
 a 
0.286 
 
0.957 
0.889 
0.015
 c 
0.259 
 
0.884 
0.870 
0.348 
0.423 
 
0.278 
0.054
 b 
0.006
 d 
 
0.182 
0.818 
9.5993 
 
 
0.4157 
0.4244 
0.4157 
-4.0E-8 
0.0078 
0.0165
  
0.2664 
0.1380 
 
0.5545 
0.0223
  
0.5076 
0.0515 
 
0.1503 
0.0564 
0.2395 
0.1092 
 
0.1011 
0.4200 
0.3879 
 
6.9E-9 
0.1047 
0.000
 d 
 
 
0.017
 c 
0.079
 b 
0.002
 d 
1.000 
0.962 
0.901 
0.077
 b 
0.312 
 
0.057
 b 
0.902 
0.003
 d 
0.651 
 
0.325 
0.685 
0.290 
0.499 
 
0.510 
0.003
 d 
0.082
 b 
 
0.286 
0.423 
9.9875 
 
 
0.1772 
0.3629 
0.2696 
-0.0418 
0.1567 
0.1518 
0.3414 
0.3314 
 
0.4414 
0.0723 
0.4521 
-0.0040 
 
0.2329 
0.1385 
0.2797 
0.1762 
 
-0.0951 
0.4778 
0.6619 
 
4.6E-9 
0.2046 
0.000 
 
 
0.122
 a 
0.015
 c 
0.012
 c 
0.630 
0.435 
0.090
 b 
0.018
 c 
0.009
 d 
 
0.063
 b 
0.663 
0.007
 d 
0.965 
 
0.045
 c 
0.268 
0.138
 a 
0.244 
 
0.407 
0.000
 d 
0.010
 d 
 
0.391 
0.041
 c 
10.2812 
 
 
0.2609 
0.3827 
0.0610 
0.0356 
0.5257 
0.0780 
0.1738 
0.2376 
 
0.5263 
0.2276 
0.7168 
0.0313 
 
0.2062 
0.0903 
0.2275 
0.1199 
 
-0.1321 
0.4661 
0.9066 
 
4.7E-9 
0.2214 
0.000
 d 
 
 
0.001
 d 
0.024
 c 
0.428 
0.623 
0.074
 b 
0.374 
0.135
 a 
0.015
 c 
 
0.100
 b 
0.294 
0.004
 d 
0.685 
 
0.039
 c 
0.326 
0.102
 a 
0.469 
 
0.277 
0.001
 d 
0.014 
 
0.343 
0.017
 c 
10.5652 
 
 
0.2535 
0.3430 
-0.0506 
-0.0989 
0.4892 
0.0927 
0.2469 
0.2579 
 
0.8175 
0.5095 
0.7832 
0.0814 
 
0.0615 
0.0995 
0.1533 
0.1676 
 
0.1134 
0.3864 
0.8511 
 
3.3E-9 
0.3363 
0.000
 d 
 
 
0.002
 d 
0.191 
0.722 
0.352 
0.134
 a 
0.336 
0.099
 b 
0.066
 b 
 
0.025
 c 
0.009
 d 
0.019
 c 
0.421 
 
0.596 
0.384 
0.729 
0.460 
 
0.527 
0.013
 c 
0.219 
 
0.928 
0.018
 c 
9.9802 
 
 
0.2458 
0.4824 
0.1532 
0.0208 
0.3565 
0.1041 
0.2607 
0.3186 
 
0.4460 
0.1554 
0.6479 
0.0237 
 
0.1340 
-0.0178 
0.2389 
0.1232 
 
0.0212 
0.5590 
0.8478 
 
6.2E-9 
0.1823 
0.000
 d 
 
 
0.012
 c 
0.001
 d 
0.044
 c 
0.805 
0.006
 d 
0.237 
0.028
 c 
0.000
 d 
 
0.003
 d 
0.206 
0.000
 d 
0.773 
 
0.229 
0.855 
0.124
 a 
0.301 
 
0.854 
0.000
 d 
0.000
 d 
 
0.160 
0.052
 b 
Note: a—significance at the 15% level; b—10%; c—5%; d—1%.  
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Table C2. Tests of equality of coefficients across quantiles, unionized enterprises only 
 
Tests are one-sided t-tests, H0: coefficient(QA) = coefficient(QB). The t-statistic is given as the 
numerical value.  
 
a-significant at the 15% level 
b-significant at the 10% level 
c-significant at the  5% level 
d-significant at the  1% level 
 
  yrgroup2 yrgroup3  Ivorian  union  density 
QA Q B  t-stat p-value t-stat p-value t-stat p-value t-stat p-value 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.25 
0.25 
0.25 
0.50 
0.50 
0.75 
0.25 
0.50 
0.75 
0.90 
0.50 
0.75 
0.90 
0.75 
0.90 
0.90 
0.02 
0.45 
0.45 
1.72 
0.46 
0.43 
1.93 
0.05 
1.24 
1.16 
0.4384 
0.2508 
0.2521 
0.0949 
0.2491 
0.2568 
0.0827 
0.4129 
0.1327 
0.1415 
0.11 
0.12 
0.77 
1.72 
0.57 
1.57 
2.45 
0.65 
1.46 
0.58 
0.3674 
0.3663 
0.1905 
0.0951 
0.2246 
0.1056 
0.0589 
0.2095 
0.1140 
0.2236 
0.00 
0.57 
6.00 
7.38 
0.96 
7.41 
8.29 
4.64 
5.78 
1.46 
0.4959 
0.2252 
0.0073 
0.0034 
0.1639 
0.0034 
0.0021 
0.0158 
0.0083 
0.1141 
0.16 
0.10 
0.03 
1.81 
0.00 
0.01 
2.66 
0.01 
2.85 
3.39 
0.3450 
0.3768 
0.4348 
0.0897 
0.4913 
0.4717 
0.0518 
0.4610 
0.0461 
0.0330 
 
  edubasic eduhigh  tenure2  tenure3 
QA Q B  t-stat p-value t-stat p-value t-stat p-value t-stat p-value 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.25 
0.25 
0.25 
0.50 
0.50 
0.75 
0.25 
0.50 
0.75 
0.90 
0.50 
0.75 
0.90 
0.75 
0.90 
0.90 
0.21 
0.38 
1.52 
2.19 
0.07 
1.13 
1.72 
1.05 
1.45 
0.18 
0.3223 
0.2700 
0.1089 
0.0696 
0.3981 
0.1442 
0.0948 
0.1534 
0.1142 
0.3359 
0.17 
0.12 
1.50 
1.16 
0.00 
1.33 
0.91 
1.39 
0.74 
0.07 
0.3390 
0.3666 
0.1109 
0.1412 
0.4750 
0.1247 
0.1696 
0.1193 
0.1957 
0.3982 
0.92 
0.25 
0.45 
2.88 
3.62 
0.00 
1.86 
1.95 
4.30 
2.47 
0.1689 
0.3082 
0.2515 
0.0452 
0.0288 
0.4894 
0.0864 
0.0814 
0.0193 
0.0582 
0.95 
0.77 
0.28 
2.42 
0.01 
0.03 
1.34 
0.09 
1.31 
2.42 
0.1652 
0.1902 
0.3000 
0.0600 
0.4557 
0.4284 
0.1234 
0.3823 
0.1368 
0.0601 
 
  manager admsales techmain  qprod 
QA Q B  t-stat p-value t-stat p-value t-stat p-value t-stat p-value 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.25 
0.25 
0.25 
0.50 
0.50 
0.75 
0.25 
0.50 
0.75 
0.90 
0.50 
0.75 
0.90 
0.75 
0.90 
0.90 
0.08 
2.66 
6.99 
11.29 
3.83 
8.90 
13.64 
2.56 
6.25 
2.79 
0.3881 
0.0516 
0.0042 
0.0004 
0.0254 
0.0015 
0.0001 
0.0550 
0.0064 
0.0478 
0.28 
4.67 
14.71 
13.75 
6.05 
19.53 
15.95 
6.02 
5.95 
1.37 
0.2977 
0.0156 
0.0001 
0.0001 
0.0071 
0.0000 
0.0001 
0.0072 
0.0075 
0.1214 
0.04 
5.18 
7.15 
11.65 
10.4 
10.73 
14.10 
0.41 
2.50 
1.75 
0.4225 
0.0012 
0.0039 
0.0004 
0.0007 
0.0006 
0.0001 
0.2604 
0.0572 
0.0931 
0.20 
0.24 
2.14 
5.00 
1.45 
4.29 
7.09 
2.26 
4.89 
2.38 
0.3287 
0.3105 
0.0721 
0.0129 
0.1145 
0.0194 
0.0040 
0.6650 
0.0137 
0.0618 
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Table C2 (continued). Tests of equality of coefficients across quantiles, unionized 
enterprises only 
 
Tests are one-sided t-tests, H0: coefficient(QA) = coefficient(QB). The t-statistic is given as the 
numerical value.  
 
a-significant at the 15% level 
b-significant at the 10% level 
c-significant at the  5% level 
d-significant at the  1% level 
 
 
  yeard96 franlib valadper smallf 
QA Q B  t-stat p-value t-stat p-value t-stat p-value t-stat p-value 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.25 
0.25 
0.25 
0.50 
0.50 
0.75 
0.25 
0.50 
0.75 
0.90 
0.50 
0.75 
0.90 
0.75 
0.90 
0.90 
4.24 
0.65 
0.21 
0.21 
1.54 
1.53 
2.45 
0.16 
1.17 
0.91 
0.0200 
0.2099 
0.3226 
0.3244 
0.1078 
0.1080 
0.0589 
0.3461 
0.1400 
0.1705 
0.02 
0.33 
0.01 
0.21 
0.80 
0.05 
0.33 
0.26 
0.01 
0.19 
0.4382 
0.2842 
0.4571 
0.3217 
0.1856 
0.4111 
0.2829 
0.3068 
0.4583 
0.3303 
0.48 
0.17 
0.00 
0.09 
1.48 
0.18 
0.01 
0.18 
0.23 
0.12 
0.2442 
0.3417 
0.4905 
0.3830 
0.1125 
0.3365 
0.4701 
0.3347 
0.3164 
0.3668 
0.37 
0.10 
0.00 
0.81 
0.08 
0.21 
0.40 
0.09 
0.61 
1.07 
0.2710 
0.3739 
0.4869 
0.1837 
0.3888 
0.3237 
0.2637 
0.3824 
0.2172 
0.1512 
 
  mediumf largef  food  wood 
QA Q B  t-stat p-value t-stat p-value t-stat p-value t-stat p-value 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.25 
0.25 
0.25 
0.50 
0.50 
0.75 
0.25 
0.50 
0.75 
0.90 
0.50 
0.75 
0.90 
0.75 
0.90 
0.90 
0.35 
0.85 
0.49 
0.94 
0.24 
0.11 
0.53 
0.00 
0.26 
0.38 
0.2759 
0.1787 
0.2429 
0.1669 
0.3134 
0.3726 
0.2333 
0.4796 
0.3056 
0.2701 
0.42 
0.12 
0.47 
0.08 
1.20 
1.74 
0.00 
0.31 
0.26 
0.77 
0.2583 
0.3648 
0.2474 
0.3856 
0.1371 
0.0940 
0.4996 
0.2878 
0.3037 
0.1902 
0.25 
0.01 
0.48 
2.01 
0.50 
0.27 
2.46 
2.32 
5.36 
3.13 
0.3077 
0.4643 
0.2439 
0.0785 
0.2402 
0.3011 
0.0586 
0.0643 
0.0105 
0.0387 
0.16 
1.27 
0.06 
0.65 
3.16 
0.02 
2.78 
3.34 
8.05 
4.49 
0.3469 
0.1301 
0.4009 
0.2104 
0.0380 
0.4457 
0.0478 
0.0340 
0.0024 
0.0173 
 
  metal other  industry    
QA Q B  t-stat p-value t-stat p-value         
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.25 
0.25 
0.25 
0.50 
0.50 
0.75 
0.25 
0.50 
0.75 
0.90 
0.50 
0.75 
0.90 
0.75 
0.90 
0.90 
0.35 
1.55 
0.71 
0.02 
2.37 
0.43 
0.75 
0.66 
4.10 
3.56 
0.2781 
0.1072 
0.1998 
0.4498 
0.0619 
0.2572 
0.1933 
0.2077 
0.0217 
0.0298 
0.07 
0.06 
0.12 
1.02 
0.00 
0.78 
2.78 
1.17 
3.18 
1.95 
0.3993 
0.4010 
0.3621 
0.1568 
0.4722 
0.1891 
0.0479 
0.1397 
0.0375 
0.0816 
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Table C3. Tests of equality of coefficients across quantiles, non-unionized enterprises only 
 
Tests are one-sided t-tests, H0: coefficient(QA) = coefficient(QB). The t-statistic is given as the 
numerical value. 
 
a-significant at the 15% level 
b-significant at the 10% level 
c-significant at the  5% level 
d-significant at the  1% level 
 
  yrgroup2 yrgroup3  Ivorian   
QA Q B  t-stat p-value t-stat p-value t-stat p-value     
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.25 
0.25 
0.25 
0.50 
0.50 
0.75 
0.25 
0.50 
0.75 
0.90 
0.50 
0.75 
0.90 
0.75 
0.90 
0.90 
0.21 
2.05 
1.13 
1.12 
2.55 
0.89 
0.90 
0.60 
0.40 
0.01 
0.3243 
0.0767 
0.1439 
0.1457 
0.0559 
0.1727 
0.1725 
0.2195 
0.2632 
0.4628 
1.05 
1.44 
1.14 
0.73 
0.09 
0.03 
0.05 
0.01 
0.00 
0.02 
0.1528 
0.1158 
0.1432 
0.1970 
0.3832 
0.4340 
0.4107 
0.4546 
0.4747 
0.4397 
3.40 
0.42 
0.32 
1.13 
1.34 
5.89 
7.21 
4.73 
4.86 
1.10 
0.0333 
0.2590 
0.2859 
0.1445 
0.1244 
0.0080 
0.0039 
0.0154 
0.0142 
0.1476 
  
 
  edubasic eduhigh  tenure2  tenure3 
QA Q B  t-stat p-value t-stat p-value t-stat p-value t-stat p-value 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.25 
0.25 
0.25 
0.50 
0.50 
0.75 
0.25 
0.50 
0.75 
0.90 
0.50 
0.75 
0.90 
0.75 
0.90 
0.90 
0.57 
0.82 
0.18 
1.28 
0.14 
0.08 
0.42 
0.90 
0.25 
2.55 
0.2262 
0.1836 
0.3349 
0.1293 
0.3563 
0.3879 
0.2576 
0.1722 
0.3071 
0.0560 
0.26 
0.01 
1.08 
0.72 
0.47 
3.14 
1.87 
2.20 
1.08 
0.02 
0.3048 
0.4700 
0.1496 
0.1989 
0.2461 
0.0389 
0.0863 
0.0698 
0.1502 
0.4500 
0.80 
0.00 
0.19 
0.12 
1.42 
0.21 
0.26 
0.85 
0.31 
0.03 
0.1854 
0.4753 
0.3338 
0.3647 
0.1174 
0.3222 
0.3038 
0.1784 
0.2894 
0.4301 
0.24 
0.00 
0.78 
0.24 
0.28 
0.35 
0.01 
1.92 
0.39 
0.33 
0.3112 
0.4775 
0.1888 
0.3140 
0.2986 
0.2764 
0.4571 
0.0836 
0.2671 
0.2818 
 
  manager admsales techmain  qprod 
QA Q B  t-stat p-value t-stat p-value t-stat p-value t-stat p-value 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.25 
0.25 
0.25 
0.50 
0.50 
0.75 
0.25 
0.50 
0.75 
0.90 
0.50 
0.75 
0.90 
0.75 
0.90 
0.90 
3.12 
1.3 
1.24 
2.58 
0.20 
0.01 
0.46 
0.10 
1.31 
0.95 
0.0393 
0.1274 
0.1337 
0.0548 
0.3275 
0.4686 
0.2499 
0.3764 
0.1269 
0.1660 
0.00 
0.03 
0.46 
2.64 
0.09 
0.78 
3.85 
0.73 
4.59 
2.43 
0.4825 
0.4309 
0.2481 
0.0529 
0.3850 
0.1891 
0.0254 
0.1977 
0.0166 
0.0602 
0.27 
0.35 
0.11 
0.16 
0.10 
0.76 
0.50 
1.93 
0.86 
0.04 
0.3024 
0.2782 
0.3678 
0.3471 
0.3781 
0.1928 
0.2406 
0.0830 
0.1778 
0.4241 
1.17 
1.55 
0.95 
0.42 
0.28 
0.03 
0.05 
0.17 
0.58 
0.34 
0.1407 
0.1071 
0.1657 
0.2599 
0.2988 
0.4327 
0.4152 
0.3404 
0.2238 
0.2798 
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Table C3 (continued). Tests of equality of coefficients across quantiles, non-unionized 
enterprises only 
 
Tests are one-sided t-tests, H0: coefficient(QA) = coefficient(QB). The t-statistic is given as the 
numerical value. 
 
a-significant at the 15% level 
b-significant at the 10% level 
c-significant at the  5% level 
d-significant at the  1% level 
 
 
  yeard96 franlib valadper smallf 
QA Q B  t-stat p-value t-stat p-value t-stat p-value t-stat p-value 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.25 
0.25 
0.25 
0.50 
0.50 
0.75 
0.25 
0.50 
0.75 
0.90 
0.50 
0.75 
0.90 
0.75 
0.90 
0.90 
0.82 
1.69 
1.61 
3.21 
0.62 
0.61 
2.02 
0.02 
0.88 
1.00 
0.1835 
0.0976 
0.1030 
0.0372 
0.2167 
0.2182 
0.0784 
0.4380 
0.1752 
0.1594 
0.13 
0.52 
0.04 
0.08 
2.41 
0.46 
0.50 
0.65 
0.25 
0.03 
0.3604 
0.2350 
0.4181 
0.3905 
0.0611 
0.2499 
0.2411 
0.2100 
0.3087 
0.4308 
0.50 
0.75 
0.62 
0.68 
0.19 
0.11 
0.20 
0.00 
0.04 
0.06 
0.2402 
0.1938 
0.2156 
0.2054 
0.3313 
0.3694 
0.3273 
0.4942 
0.4233 
0.4031 
0.54 
2.37 
2.49 
0.21 
2.06 
1.76 
0.00 
0.08 
1.25 
2.52 
0.2314 
0.0624 
0.0578 
0.3232 
0.0765 
0.0928 
0.4780 
0.3864 
0.1326 
0.0568 
 
  mediumf largef  food  wood 
QA Q B  t-stat p-value t-stat p-value t-stat p-value t-stat p-value 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.25 
0.25 
0.25 
0.50 
0.50 
0.75 
0.25 
0.50 
0.75 
0.90 
0.50 
0.75 
0.90 
0.75 
0.90 
0.90 
0.09 
0.30 
0.17 
0.01 
0.19 
0.07 
0.03 
0.01 
0.29 
0.28 
0.3821 
0.2917 
0.3415 
0.4696 
0.3308 
0.3957 
0.4318 
0.4660 
0.2948 
0.2974 
2.51 
0.06 
0.19 
0.02 
1.01 
2.84 
0.47 
0.75 
0.09 
0.01 
0.0572 
0.3995 
0.3313 
0.4452 
0.1574 
0.0467 
0.2471 
0.1935 
0.3848 
0.4644 
0.38 
0.85 
0.56 
0.02 
0.35 
0.11 
0.22 
0.07 
1.54 
1.48 
0.2701 
0.1784 
0.2267 
0.4506 
0.2776 
0.3724 
0.3203 
0.3950 
0.1082 
0.1123 
0.25 
0.69 
0.33 
0.35 
0.43 
0.05 
0.07 
0.22 
0.09 
0.01 
0.3077 
0.2039 
0.2840 
0.2762 
0.2568 
0.4100 
0.3936 
0.3192 
0.3796 
0.4656 
 
  metal other  industry    
QA Q B  t-stat p-value t-stat p-value         
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.25 
0.25 
0.25 
0.50 
0.50 
0.75 
0.25 
0.50 
0.75 
0.90 
0.50 
0.75 
0.90 
0.75 
0.90 
0.90 
0.01 
0.00 
0.01 
0.05 
0.04 
0.00 
0.04 
0.11 
0.11 
0.04 
0.4647 
0.4746 
0.4576 
0.4116 
0.4227 
0.4811 
0.4221 
0.3728 
0.3727 
0.4181 
0.10 
0.00 
0.03 
0.00 
0.14 
0.00 
0.04 
0.12 
0.00 
0.06 
0.3750 
0.4834 
0.4297 
0.4985 
0.3528 
0.4812 
0.4171 
0.3653 
0.4855 
0.4058 
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Figure C1 
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Workers in firms with 40 employees or more 
n=528  quantile regressions  OLS 
  0.1  0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90     
  coef pvalue  coef pvalue  coef pvalue  coef pvalue  coef pvalue  coef pvalue 
constant 
individual 
characteristics 
yrgroup2 
yrgroup3 
Ivorian 
union density 
edubasic 
eduhigh 
tenure2 
tenure3 
french/leban 
occupation 
manager 
adm/sales 
tech/mainten 
qualified prod. 
industry 
food 
wood 
metal 
other/no stated 
 
value added 
year dummy  
10.0154 
 
 
0.1567 
0.2469 
0.0151 
-0.1276 
-0.0142 
0.3362 
0.2184 
0.4085 
0.0977 
 
0.4634 
0.2504 
0.2489 
-0.0097 
 
0.1237 
0.3911 
0.4459 
0.8005 
 
6.5E-9 
-0.0311 
0.000
d 
 
 
0.454 
0.287 
0.867 
0.307 
0.870 
0.004
 d 
0.076 
0.001
 d 
0.275 
 
0.001
 d 
0.020
c 
0.094
b 
0.903 
 
0.612 
0.065
 b 
0.047
 c 
0.004
 d 
 
0.265 
0.775 
10.0864 
 
 
0.3140 
0.3971 
0.0831 
-0.1098 
0.0204 
0.3818 
0.1526 
0.3583 
0.1080 
 
0.5465 
0.4276 
0.3708 
1.1E-8 
 
0.0954 
0.1847 
0.1906 
0.3887 
 
1.1E-8 
0.1871 
0.000
 d 
 
 
0.070
 b 
0.041
 c 
0.287 
0.319 
0.764 
0.001
 d 
0.056
 b 
0.000
 d 
0.114
 a 
 
0.000
 d 
0.002
 d 
0.002
 d 
1.000 
 
0.444 
0.076
 b 
0.087
 b 
0.023
 c 
 
0.007
 d 
0.016
 c 
10.3631 
 
 
0.2424 
0.4094 
0.0047 
-0.1419 
0.0516 
0.4994 
0.1347 
0.2646 
0.0788 
 
0.7618 
0.6761 
0.6497 
0.0906 
 
0.3038 
0.1806 
0.2647 
0.4758 
 
8.0E-9 
0.1731 
0.000
 d 
 
 
0.070
 b 
0.010
 d 
0.964 
0.138
 a 
0.460 
0.001
 d 
0.060
 b 
0.003
 d 
0.281 
 
0.000
 d 
0.000
 d 
0.000
 d 
0.170 
 
0.007
 d 
0.098
 b 
0.013
 c 
0.001
 d 
 
0.015
 c 
0.025
 c 
10.6268
  
 
 
0.3673 
0.5612 
-0.1551 
-0.1353 
0.0904 
0.6598 
0.0163 
0.2020 
0.0694 
 
0.9502 
0.8310 
0.8059 
0.1987 
 
0.3610 
0.1880 
0.1736 
0.3558 
 
8.4E-9 
0.1920 
0.000
 d 
 
 
0.000
 d 
0.000
 d 
0.116
 a 
0.236 
0.251 
0.000
 d 
0.865 
0.032
 c 
0.361 
 
0.000
 d 
0.000
 d 
0.000
 d 
0.014
 c 
 
0.001
 d 
0.048
 c 
0.088
 b 
0.001
 d 
 
0.088
 b 
0.011
 c 
10.5598 
 
 
0.5275 
0.8206 
-0.2030 
-0.1135 
0.1987 
0.8077 
-0.0943 
0.0779 
0.0843 
 
1.2093 
0.8517 
0.9944 
0.3678 
 
0.4675 
0.3234 
0.3121 
0.3684 
 
1.4E-8 
0.1495 
0.000
 d 
 
 
0.000
 d 
0.000
 d 
0.308 
0.377 
0.064
 b 
0.001
 d 
0.463 
0.556 
0.399 
 
0.000
 d 
0.000
 d 
0.000
 d 
0.001
 d 
 
0.003
 d 
0.019
 c 
0.009
 d 
0.064
 b 
 
0.074
 b 
0.288 
10.3209 
 
 
0.3513 
0.5571 
-0.1086 
-0.1978 
0.1262 
0.6918 
0.1154 
0.2490 
0.1321 
 
0.7178 
0.5695 
0.6114 
0.1030 
 
0.2757 
0.2250 
0.2387 
0.4173 
 
1.0E-8 
0.1969 
0.000
 d 
 
 
0.013
c 
0.000
 d 
0.150
 a 
0.026
 c 
0.102
 a 
0.000
 d 
0.101
 a 
0.000
 d 
0.048
 c 
 
0.000
 d 
0.000
 d 
0.000
 d 
0.149
 a 
 
0.004
 d 
0.020
 c 
0.014
 c 
0.002
 d 
 
0.006
 d 
0.005
 d 
Workers in firms with less than 40 employees 
n=363  quantile regressions  OLS 
  0.1  0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90     
  coef pvalue  coef pvalue  coef pvalue  coef pvalue  coef pvalue  coef pvalue 
constant 
individual 
characteristics 
yrgroup2 
yrgroup3 
Ivorian 
union density 
edubasic 
eduhigh 
tenure2 
tenure3 
french/leban 
occupation 
manager 
adm/sales 
tech/mainten 
qualified prod. 
industry 
food 
wood 
metal 
other/no stated 
 
value added 
year dummy  
9..3356 
 
 
0.3755 
0.5561 
0.0986 
0.2637 
-4.5E-8 
-0.0458 
0.1698 
0.1506 
0.2769 
 
0.8511 
0.0439 
0.6707 
0.3495 
 
0.2118 
-0.1287 
0.2407 
-0.2032 
 
2.4E-8 
0.2623 
0.000
 d 
 
 
0.056
 b 
0.009
 d 
0.433 
0.022
 c 
1.000 
0.775 
0.178 
0.199 
0.008
 d 
 
0.000
 d 
0.766 
0.000
 d 
0.001
 d 
 
0.178 
0.428 
0.076
 b 
0.153 
 
0.000
 d 
0.003
 d 
9.8308 
 
 
0.1264 
0.3556 
0.1473 
0.2264 
-0.0015 
0.1510 
0.1706 
0.1586 
0.2855 
 
0.7674 
0.1588 
0.4749 
0.1921 
 
0.1393 
-0.0320 
0.1751 
-0.2362 
 
1.6E-8 
0.2229 
0.000
 d 
 
 
0.152 
0.015
 c 
0.103
 a 
0.010
 d 
0.985 
0.383 
0.084
 b 
0.178 
0.000
 d 
 
0.000
 d 
0.209 
0.000
 d 
0.026
 c 
 
0.270 
0.810 
0.131
 a 
0.028
 c 
 
0.000
 d 
0.009
 d 
10.040 
 
 
0.2499 
0.3817 
0.1318 
0.0816 
-0.0192 
0.3850 
0.1745 
0.2133 
0.3037 
 
0.7216 
0.2092 
0.3628 
0.1573 
 
0.2102 
0.1355 
0.2921 
-0.2142 
 
9.3E-9 
0.1835 
0.000
 d 
 
 
0.006
 d 
0.001
 d 
0.115
 a 
0.329 
0.759 
0.061
 b 
0.031
 c 
0.017
 c 
0.000
 d 
 
0.000
 d 
0.154 
0.031
 c 
0.028
 c 
 
0.060
 b 
0.217 
0.011
 c 
0.039
 c 
 
0.008
 d 
0.008
 d 
10.5103 
 
 
0.1821 
0.2750 
-0.0736 
0.2633 
-0.0542 
0.6730 
0.1401 
0.1737 
0.2781 
 
0.8598 
0.4511 
0.7276 
0.1080 
 
0.1056 
0.0766 
0.1963 
-0.2480 
 
7.6E-9 
0.2325 
0.000
 d 
 
 
0.049
 c 
0.028
 c 
0.399 
0.040
 c 
0.403 
0.023
 c 
0.121
 a 
0.110
 a 
0.002
 d 
 
0.003
 d 
0.053
 b 
0.003
 d 
0.113
 a 
 
0.300 
0.451 
0.127
 a 
0.146
 a 
 
0.176 
0.012
 c 
10.7841 
 
 
0.1310
  
0.0888 
-0.2961 
0.3698 
-0.0422 
0.6452 
0.0489
  
0.2031 
0.1882 
 
0.1603 
0.8284 
0.6454 
0.1563 
 
0.1830 
0.2333 
0.7059 
-0.1251 
 
9.8E-9 
0.3319 
0.000
 d 
 
 
0.204 
0.531 
0.052
 b 
0.052
 b 
0.668 
0.119
 a 
0.669 
0.194 
0.133
 a 
 
0.001
 d 
0.006
 d 
0.008
 d 
0.112
 a 
 
0.128
a 
0.077
 b 
0.009
 d 
0.571 
 
0.176 
0.025
 c 
10.0582 
 
 
0.1859 
0.3400 
0.0105 
0.2994 
0.0197 
0.4909 
0.1373 
0.2571 
0.2813 
 
0.8440 
0.4462 
0.5545 
0.1533 
 
0.0831 
0.0102 
0.3335 
-0.1693 
 
1.4E-8 
0.2636 
0.000
 d 
 
 
0.035
 c 
0.006
 d 
0.883 
0.001
 d 
0.798 
0.000
 d 
0.078
b 
0.009
 d 
0.001
 d 
 
0.000
 d 
0.000
 d 
0.000
 d 
0.041
 c 
 
0.469 
0.925 
0.005
 d 
0.198 
 
0.000
 d 
0.000
d 
Note: a—significance at the 15% level; b—10%; c—5%; d—1%. 
 y
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
10 15 20 25 30 40 50 60 70 75 80 90
quantile
white-collar blue-collar
  
41 
Appendix E, Literature overview of studies of the labor market in Côte d’Ivoire 
 
Coefficient of key variables  Author(s)  Year  Purpose of study  Data  Dependent 
variable 
Method 
Variable Coeff 
Significant 
** = 5% 
* = 10% 
 
Grootaert, C.  1990  To compare graduates of the formal 
vocational and technical education 
system in Côte d’Ivoire with those of 
informal apprenticeships explicitly 
considering the structure of the labor 
market 
CILSS 
1985 
log 
monthly 
earnings 
Heckman’s 
selection model 
yrs  primary edu  
yrs second. edu 
yrs higher edu 
yrs current job exp 
yrs current job exp, sq 
diplomas (different types) 
rural dummy 
non-ivorien dummy         
female dummy 
0.031 
0.127 
0.130 
0.084 
-0.0015 
varies 
-0.289 
-0.042 
0.079 
 
** 
** 
** 
** 
none 
 
** 
 
 
Komenan, A.G. and 
Gootaert, C. 
1990  To analyze pay differences between 
teachers and other wage earners in 
Côte d’Ivoire controling for various 
personal characteristics 
CILSS 
1985 
log 
monthly 
total wages 
Wage regressions 
(also on different 
sub-groups – not 
reported here) 
yrs of schooling 
diploma 
experience 
experience, sq 
log monthly hours worked 
government dummy 
female 
ivorien 
abidjan dummy 
teacher dummy 
0.1678 
0.1228 
0.1151 
-0.002 
0.1302 
-0.0224 
-0.1782 
0.1545 
-0.092 
0.008 
** 
** 
** 
** 
 
 
* 
 
 
 
Hoddinott, J.  1996  To analyze the relationship between 
wages and unemployment; with focus 
on the urban labor market 
CILSS 
1985, 1986, 
1987, 
pooled 
sample 
log hourly 
nominal 
wages 
2 stage method; a 
logit for 
participating in 
the labor market 
lagged rate of  unempl. 
potential exp 
potential exp, sq 
completed grades 
head of household 
married 
non-ivorien 
occupation 
      service worker 
      skilled worker 
      teacher/principal 
      white collar 
      other tech/prof 
location 
      abidjan or bouake 
      eastern region town 
      western region town 
-0.7492 
0.0677 
-0.0026 
0.1283 
-0.1002 
0.1094 
-0.0875 
 
-0.1216 
-0.0256 
0.5723 
0.3420 
0.0903 
 
0.1190 
-0.3127 
-0.3908 
** 
* 
 
** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
** 
** 
 
 
 
** 
** 
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Coefficient of key variables 
Vijverberg, W.P.M. 
and Van der Gaag, J. 
1991  To challenge the usual assumption of 
a homogenous wage sector 
CILSS 
1985 
log hourly 
wage rate 
(including 
the cash 
value of in-
kind 
income 
ML two-stage 
method with both 
OLS and GLS in 
the structural 
model (GLS 
reported here) 
yrs schooling 
yrs schooling, sq/100 
experience in current job  
exp. current job, sq/100 
general experience 
general experience, sq/100 
female dummy 
non-ivorien 
0.077 
0.240 
0.106 
-0.214 
0.048 
-0.085 
0.420 
-0.089 
 
 
** 
** 
* 
 
** 
 
Vijverberg, W.P.M. 
and Van der Gaag, J. 
1988  To contribute to the Mincerian 
returns to education literature and 
focus on public-private sector 
differentials 
CILSS 
1985 
log wages 
for public 
and private 
sector 
workers 
respectivel
y 
Full information 
maximum 
likelihood 
(FIML) 
Public sector: 
      yrs elem sch 
      yrs junior high 1 
      diploma elem sch 
      diploma junior high 1 
      higher diploma 
      current job experience 
      curr job exp, sq*100 
      non-ivorien 
      female 
      RRR 
Private sector: 
      yrs elem sch 
      yrs junior high 1 
      diploma elem sch 
      diploma junior high 1 
      higher diploma 
      current job experience 
      curr job exp, sq*100 
      non-ivorien 
      female 
      RRR       
 
0.035 
0.205 
0.801 
0.424 
0.621 
0.087 
-0.868 
--- 
-0.125 
0.108 
 
0.018 
0.012 
0.395 
0.617 
0.221 
0.116 
-2.258 
0.285 
0.141 
0.147 
 
 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
 
--- 
 
 
 
 
 
* 
** 
 
** 
** 
** 
 
*  
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Coefficient of key variables 
Vijverberg, W.P.M.  1992  To seek answers to the questions: Do 
women in the labor market enjoy the 
same returns to their human capital 
investments as men do? Is the 
different treatment of women in the 
labor market a cause for the lower 
educational attainment so often 
observed among women in the third 
world? 
Pooled 
CILSS 
1985, 1986, 
1987 
log hourly 
earnings in 
wage 
employmen
t 
Two-stage 
estimation 
procedure (self-
selection model 
with two decision 
variables: where 
to live and what 
work (if any) to 
choose. 
Abidjan, men: 
      yrs elem school 
      yrs junior high 
      yrs senior high 
      yrs university 
      occupational exp 
      occup exp, sq/100 
      prior exp 
      prior exp, sq/100 
      non-ivorien 
Abidjan, women: 
      yrs elem school 
      yrs junior high 
      yrs senior high 
      yrs university 
      occupational exp 
      occup exp, sq/100 
      prior exp 
      prior exp, sq/100 
      non-ivorien 
 
0.099 
0.121 
0.162 
0.196 
0.083 
-0.121 
0.026 
-0.005 
-0.110 
 
0.020 
0.286 
0.230 
0.246 
0.102 
-0.158 
0.049 
-0.057 
0.080 
 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
 
 
 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
 
 
Vijverberg, W.P.M.  1989  To analyze whether migrants are 
more productive workers than 
nonmigrants 
CILSS 
1985-1986 
panel data 
log hourly 
wages 
Self-selection 
model with a 
choice of activity 
yrs elem school 
yrs junior high school 
yrs senior high school 
yrs university 
diploma 
      elememtary  
      junior high 
      beyond junior high 
RRR   
yrs occup. specific exp 
yrs squared*100 
yrs general exp 
yrs squared*100 
abidjan dummy 
other urban dummy 
non-ivorien 
female 
0.104 
0.102 
-0.010 
0.223 
 
0.402 
0.608 
0.642 
0.159 
0.106 
-0.217 
0.075 
-0.078 
0.160 
0.114 
-0.033 
-0.056 
** 
** 
 
** 
 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
* 
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Coefficient of key variables 
Vijverberg, W.P.M. 
and Van der Gaag, J. 
1989  To investigate wage determinants 
using the Mincerian framework; with 
a special eye on the role of credentials 
CILSS 
1985 
log hourly 
wage 
OLS yrs  elem  school 
yrs junior high school 
yrs senior high school 
yrs university 
diploma 
      elememtary  
      junior high 
      beyond junior high 
RRR   
yrs occup. specific exp 
yrs squared*1000 
yrs general exp 
yrs squared*1000 
non-ivorien 
female 
0.023 
0.088 
-0.032 
0.208 
 
0.494 
0.594 
0.536 
0.113 
0.107 
-1.909 
0.026 
0.020 
-0.117 
0.011 
 
** 
 
** 
 
** 
** 
* 
* 
** 
** 
** 
** 
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